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RIGHT OF PRIVACY: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Eugene W. Smith, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1995
This paper investigates the historical and legal
question of how the Supreme Court developed the constitu
tional right of privacy from the Civil War Amendments to
the Constitution.

The emphasis is on tracing the Court's

interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Civ
il War.
Primary sources consulted included the Constitution,
statutes, government publications, court opinions, briefs
and other parts of case records.

Newspapers, periodicals

and books were used to trace more recent developments.
The paper traces the Court's use of the legal doc
trines of substantive due process, selective incorpora
tion and the new equal protection to first create a right
of family privacy, then a right of sexual privacy.

It

concludes that the Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to
"amend" the Constitution by judicial interpretation rath
er than trying to find the original intent of the draft
ers of the Constitution or of the Civil War Amendments.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND

Introduction
This paper will trace the origin and development of
the legal doctrine that has come to be known as the
right of privacy.

The phrase, the right of privacy,

aside from its use in constitutional law, is also a com
mon term in the modern technological era.

The tabloids,

in both electronic and supermarket versions, make an in
dustry of invading the privacy of celebrities to feed
the maw of the public's appetite for titillation.

The

government has everyone numbered and catalogued in In
ternal Revenue and Social Security computer databases,
beginning at the cradle and continuing to the grave.
Users of the new computer highways find they must exer
cise care to protect both their machines and their pri
vacy.
One might be justified in concluding that the Su
preme Court developed the constitutional right of priva
cy to protect the American public, including celebri
ties, from unlawful invasions of privacy by the govern
ment and other organizations.
1

Interestingly, the right

2

of privacy, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, has
little to do with freedom from snooping activities by
the government or private individuals.
There are federal and state statutes which set lim
its on the government's use of data and provide the
means for people to find out what government files about
them contain.

There is also a body of case law, called

tort law, recognizing the right of an individual to pri
vacy and allowing one person to sue another for an inva
sion of privacy.

But the main body of constitutional

law about the right of privacy is not about governmental
use of data or intrusions on the privacy of persons.

1

The right of privacy is probably best known from
the controversy over Roe v. Wade, a case decided in
1973.

2

In that case the United States Supreme Court

ruled that a woman's right of privacy was protected by
the constitution from the power of the states to forbid
abortions.

Whether the Constitution gives the Supreme

Court power to make such a ruling has remained a cause
of political debate in every national election and in
the selection of every Supreme Court justice since that
time.
The concept of a right of privacy has also created
recent controversy over whether there is a right to die.
Proponents of such a constitutional right base their le-

4

view has been disputed.

5

The article apparently had a limited impact on the
subsequent development of the law of the right of priva
cy. If it was the authors' intent to restrain press cov
erage of public figures, their hope has not been real
ized.

The type of right Brandeis advocated has been

swallowed up by the Supreme Court's expansive reading of
First Amendment freedom of the press in libel and priva
cy suits by public figures.

6

While the Brandeis article was influential in stim
ulating the development of a right to privacy which al
lowed one person to sue another, it did not directly
create a right of privacy vis a vis the government.
Brandeis himself, during his long tenure as a Supreme
Court Justice, did contribute to development of the con
cept of a right of privacy as a limit on the power of
government.
In his article of 1890, Brandeis referred to the
work of an eminent constitutional scholar, Thomas MacIn
tyre Cooley, Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and
University of Michigan law professor.

He quoted the

phrase "the right to be let alone" from Cooley's trea
tise on the law of torts and later used similar phrasing
in a dissent in the case of Olmstead v. United States.
That phrase gradually came to be synonymous with the

5

right of privacy.

7

Olmstead was a member of a bootlegging ring and
federal agents used the new technique of wiretapping to
build a case against the bootleggers.

Olmstead and his

cohorts naturally thought that was cheating and chal
lenged his conviction, with the help of the telephone
company, on the grounds his telephone conversations were
private and the government had no right to listen in
surreptitiously. 8
In that era the focus of judicial review of the
legality of a search was on whether government agents
trespassed on a citizen's property to seize incriminat
ing evidence or to eavesdrop.

The trespass itself, if

not properly authorized by a search warrant, was a
violation of the Constitution and evidence obtained that
way could not be used by the government.

The use of new

technology allowed government agents in the Olmstead
case to intercept the most private telephone conversa
tions without physically entering the defendant's prop
erty.

Under the prevailing legal view, where there was

no trespass by government agents, there was no violation
of Olmstead's rights and his conviction was proper.
Brandeis broke free of the trespass concept the
courts had developed to enforce the Fourth Amendment ban
on warrantless searches in an era when a forcible or

6

surreptitious physical trespass by government agents was
necessary to evade the warrant requirement.

Instead, he

focused on the invasion of Olmstead's privacy without a
physical trespass the new technology made possible.
While he was in the minority in the Olmstead case, and
the Court did not then adopt his right of privacy con
cept, his insight foreshadowed later analysis.

It was

taken up by a majority of the Supreme Court in later
cases.
The modern Court currently uses privacy analysis
for search and seizure cases under a formula balancing
the reasonable expectation of privacy of the accused
against the extent of the government's intrusion.

Al

though Brandeis first suggested the idea in 1927, a ma
jority of the Court did not adopt that balancing test
until Justice John Marshall Harlan convinced a majority
to do so in the 1967 case of Katz v. United States.
While such recent cases which follow Brandeis' focus on
privacy for analyzing search and seizure issues under
the Fourth Amendment arguably constitute a branch of the
constitutional right of privacy, we actually jump ahead
of the story with the Katz case.

9

It is an interesting fact that the most controver
sial of modern cases about a right of privacy are di
rectly linked to sexuality.

The 1973 case of Roe v.

7

Wade, was about abortion; Griswold v. Connecticut in

1965, and Eisenstadt v. Baird in 1972, were about con
traceptives; Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney in 1976, and
Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986, dealt with consensual sodo

my.10

Even the most naive student of history knows that
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not debate
questions of sexuality.

Neither did Congress or the

state legislatures in ratifying the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

The text of the Constitution, including the Four

teenth Amendment, does not explicitly mention any such
right and, of course, proponents make no claim that it
does.

But, as Alexis de Tocqueville said: "There is

hardly a political question in the United States which

does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."11

The post Civil War Supreme Court has undertaken the
task of reviewing state laws affecting individual's
rights and the concomitant duty to strike laws in con
flict with the Constitution.

That perspective is, how

ever, a modern view of the Supreme Court's power.
fore the Civil War such was not the practice.

Be

To under

stand the basis of modern rulings on the right of priva
cy, it is necessary to consider the revolution in
constitutional jurisprudence which made questions of
personal rights, and state laws affecting those rights,

8

subjects upon which the Supreme Court was expected to
rule.
The answer to how a right of privacy, linked to hu
man sexuality, came to be a constitutional right is to
be found in the story of the Fourteenth Amendment which
produced a revolution in constitutional law after the
Civil War.

That revolution occurred over such a long

period of time that the word evolution may be more ap
propriate to describe the on-going process of change.
The results of the process truly were revolutionary in
the substance of the law, however.
That process took three distinct doctrinal paths.
The first to develop was the doctrine of substantive due
process, of which most of the modern constitutional
right of privacy is a subcategory.
doctrine of selective incorporation.

The second was the
A lesser part of

the constitutional right of privacy fits under that doc
trinal heading.

The third legal doctrine is sometimes

called the new equal protection, and it is less clearly
defined in the law.

It is conceptually related to sub

stantive due process and, to a lesser extent, selective
incorporation.

Because the concept of substantive due

process was the first to develop, it is the place to
start.

9

Civil War Era Constitutional Amendments
To trace the origin of the modern constitutional
doctrine of the right of privacy it is necessary to go
back to the so-called Civil War series of Constitutional
Amendments.
Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in 1833 in the
case of Barron v. Baltimore what everyone at that time
assumed, that because the Bill of Rights, the first ten
amendments to the Constitution, applied only to the fed
eral government, the states were not bound by its pro
hibitions.12

That position became the central constitu

tional problem in the aftermath of the Civil War.

How

were the former slaves to be raised from servitude if
the states they lived in wanted to keep them down?
The first Congressional move was adoption of the
Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery, proposed to the
states by Congress in February, 1865 and ratified by the
required twenty-seven states after Lincoln's assassina
tion in April, 1865.

Lincoln's death joined the issue

between the Radical Republicans in Congress and Presi
dent Andrew Johnson.

Because the Thirteenth Amendment

was seen as inadequate, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau Bill over Presi
dent Johnson's veto.

Questions were raised as to the

constitutional power of Congress to pass the Civil

10

Rights Act and Congress passed another proposed consti
tutional amendment and sent it to the states in 1866.

13

The debate over the Fourteenth Amendment in Con
gress, and in the states during the ratification pro
cess, is one of the most important and hotly debated
chapters in American legal history.

The controversy

over original intent and proper use of the Amendment has
been central to the question of whether a right of pri
vacy is even to be found in the Constitution. 14
The parts of the Fourteenth Amendment relevant to
modern Constitutional jurisprudence are three short and
vague clauses in section one.

The "due process" clause

simply says that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The "equal protection" and the "privileges and immuni
ties" clauses are equally terse; stating, respectively,
that no state shall "deny to any person the equal
protection of the laws," and that no state shall "make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States."

Unlike

the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not use words limiting it to discrimination based
on race, color or previous servitude.

15

The equal protection phrasing is not found else-

11

where in the original Constitution.

The words dealing

with due process are nearly identical to those in the
Fifth Amendment, which was understood to apply only to
the federal government when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified.

Similar privileges and immunities language is

found in both the original Constitution in Article IV,
Section 2, and in the Articles of Confederation in Ar
ticle IV, and, unlike the Bill of Rights, was applicable
to state governments from the beginning.
Privileges and Immunities
The Fourteenth Amendment had not been on the books
long before the Supreme Court was pressed to decide what
it meant.

In 1873 the Court handed down an historically

based and restrictive ruling in the Slaughter House
Cases, only seven years after ratification of the Amend
ment.

The facts of that case involved a Louisiana Re

construction state legislature that had been bribed to
grant a monopoly in the butchering business.

John Ar

chibald Campbell, a former Supreme Court Justice who re
signed when the Confederate States seceded, in a star
tling turnabout for a Confederate, urged the Court to
read the Amendment broadly and to use federal power to
strike the state sanctioned monopoly.

16

Campbell focused his brief and his oral argument

12

mostly on his theory that the privileges and immunities
language of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the civil
rights, including economic rights, of all citizens of
the United States.
clause.

He did not stress the due process

Justice Samuel Miller, a Lincoln appointee,

followed the same approach in his opinion. 17
Writing for the majority, Miller said that the pur
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide for the
"protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppression of those who had formerly exercised un
limited dominion over him." 18

It was not to give the

Supreme Court general power to pass on the wisdom of
state legislation.

The crux of his ruling was that the

privileges and immunities clause of the Amendment did
not create a new and separate bundle of civil rights for
citizens of the United States.

It did make "all persons

born or naturalized in the United States" citizens of
both the United States and of their state. 19

In short,

the states no longer determined which of their residents
were citizens and so they could not exclude the former
slaves from citizenship.

But the civil rights of those

citizens were still to be determined, with the exception
of a short list of privileges and immunities protected
by the Federal Constitution, by their state of resi
dence.20

13

Viewed in the context of the law at that time,
Miller's decision was a common sense response to Camp
bell's novel theory of the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

The states exercised considerable discretion

in deciding the legal rights of their residents, notably
in setting age limits, typically twenty-one, for the
right to make binding contracts and for the right to
vote.

They also treated women, including former slaves,

different than men.

Women were excluded entirely from

the right to vote, which in that era was usually classi
fied as a political right, not a civil right.

A married

woman was also generally considered legally incompetent
to make contracts without the consent of her husband. 21
Miller did comment in passing that under existing
precedents Louisiana's placing a restraint on the butch
er's trade was not a deprivation of property under the
due process of law clause.

In short, the grant of a mo

nopoly by the state legislature in an industry affecting
public health was not a violation of the Constitution
because it was a monopoly. 22
Justice Stephen Field disagreed.

Like Miller, he

too focused on the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

But he disagreed with Miller

that a legislative monopoly was constitutional.

He fo

cused instead on the effect it had on the right of the

14

butchers to carry on their trade.

Field found support

for his view in the 1866 Civil Rights Act which defined
the "civil rights" it sought to protect as the right to:
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit·of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and
property as enjoyed by white citizens.23
Unlike Justice Miller, he focused on the �mphasis in the
I,

Act on property rights and not on its closing reference
to race.
Justice Joseph Bradley, who agreed with Justice
Field's conclusion, dissented on the additional grounds
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to codify in
the Constitution the fundamental rights of Englishmen as
set out in Magna Charta.

As he expressed it, those

rights of "life, liberty, and property [were] inviola
ble, except by due process of law."

He also said the

"rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"
were the same as the "rights of life, liberty and prop
erty," and that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the Su
preme Court authority to enforce them even against a
state legislature. 24
That declaration of rights seemed to equate the
Fourteenth Amendment with the Declaration of Indepen
dence and the Bill of Rights, a dubious proposition the
Supreme Court has never been willing to follow.

In

15

addition to staking out what is probably the most ex
treme reading of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
by a Justice, Bradley also referred to Adam Smith's

Wealth of Nations and Blackstone's Commentaries. 25
Bradley apparently was willing to wed laissez faire eco
nomic theory to the common law and apply the progeny to
the states, foreshadowing later use of the Fourteenth
Amendment for that purpose.
Campbell's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected a wide variety of privileges and immunities,
that is, fundamental rights, and that those privileges
and immunities were the same for all citizens of the
United States, found limited support in the obiter dic
tum of Justice Bushrod Washington's 1823 opinion in the
case of Corfield v. Coryell. 26

However, Justice Wash

ington, in interpreting the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV of the Constitution, had actually
decided that the privilege at issue, harvesting oysters
in New Jersey waters, was one over which the state of
New Jersey had exclusive control.
Washington's ruling was consistent with the
application of similar language in the Articles of Con
federation, which had been the source of the privileges
and immunities clause in the Constitution.

Stripped of

the ringing declarations of Washington and Bradley, the

16

privileges and immunities concept was simply a declara
tion that the individual states could not discriminate
against citizens of another state when they were tempo
rarily present in a host state.

The clause did not vest

nonresident citizens with political rights or privileges
such as the right to vote or hold office.

It simply al

lowed them the protection of the laws of the host state
in such matters as buying and selling property and mak
ing and enforcing contracts. 27 That is the same princi
ple familiar today in state legal rules which require
nonresident students at state colleges and universities
to pay a higher rate of tuition.
The limited reading Justice Miller gave to the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been severely criticized by some modern
historians. They apparently believe it was part of a
pattern of callous decisions by the Supreme Court which
ignored the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment and left the former slaves to the mercy of the
black codes and segregation.

28

They do not focus on the

fact that Miller did say the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to protect the former slaves, but not to change
the structure of federalism.

He simply rejected the

idea that the Amendment was designed as a tool to allow
federal courts to decide what the economic rights of

17
citizens were within their state of residence.

In

short, he rejected the role of subjecting state common
law and statutory rules to judicial review on the basis
of an evaluation of their merits, or to phrase it in a
way which became very familiar in later Supreme Court
jurisprudence, their substance.
It is true that the case was decided at the begin
ning of a period when the Supreme Court read the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment very narrowly in matters
dealing with race.

But it should be noted that the

Slaughter House Cases decision was not about the rights
of the freedmen.

Unlike other cases decided in the fol

lowing twenty-five years, such as Plessy v.
the Civil Rights Cases, and United States v.

Ferguson,
Harris;

the Slaughter House Cases definition of the privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
never been repudiated by the Supreme Court.

It remains

the law of the land for that part of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

29

However, Miller's limitation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the context of race, as the language of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 also did for its enumerated
rights, rejecting the idea that it could be expanded to
other areas such as economic regulation, was followed by
the Supreme Court only until the 1897 decision in All-

18

geyer v. Louisiana. 30

That case marked the beginning of

the assumption of power by the Supreme Court to decide
if state economic legislation violated the Court's read
ing of the due process clause.
Economic Substantive Due Process
The privileges and immunities clause having been
rejected as a tool to nationalize judicial review of
economic legislation, advocates of a broad reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment turned to the due process
clause.

The language of that clause was wonderfully

vague, rather like the language of the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution.

Fol

lowing the path suggested by Justice Bradley in his
Slaughter House Cases dissent, advocates argued that due
process meant that a person had liberty to pursue eco
nomic pursuits free from state regulation.

The Supreme

Court began to acknowledge such a right in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana.
In the Allgeyer case, Justice Rufus Peckham held
that a Louisiana statute requiring insurance companies
doing business in the state to have a license there vio
lated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

Peckham said the liberty the due process clause

protected included the right to pursue any occupation

19
and to make any contract necessary to carry on a trade
or to manage property, free from state interference.
That reading of the due process clause was obviously
similar to the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act of
It was also similar to what Campbell had argued

1866.

for in the Slaughter House Cases, even if Justice Peck
ham did not explicitly say he intended the similarity. 31
Although there had been precursors to economic sub
stantive due process in state cases, and in litigation
by railroads against state rate regulation, the Allgeyer
case marked the first full incorporation of the doctrine
into Fourteenth Amendment analysis by the Supreme
Court.

32

It was followed by a long line of cases which

inconsistently ruled on state laws attempting to regu
late business and employment conditions.
In one of those cases, Lochner v. New York, Justice
Peckham's 1905 opinion struck down a state law prohibit
ing bakery workers from working over 10 hours per day or
60 hours per week.

He said that law was not a proper

exercise of the state's police power because it interf
ered with the right of contract between employer and em
ployee, and that right of contract was a liberty pro
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.JJ
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes dissented with his
famous dictum that:

''The Fourteenth Amendment does not

20

enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 34
There was disagreement with the Court's use of eco
nomic substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike progressive social legislation
throughout the Progressive era.

Yet, while substantive

due process was the vehicle for striking many new state
labor laws, the Court did not strike all labor laws in
that era.

Estimates vary, but it appears that more

state laws were sustained than were struck.

The Court

apparently had a paternalistic soft spot for women and
children and upheld regulation of hours for them.

35

Justice Peckham's views as set out in the Lochner
case did prevail until the New Deal, when new appointees
to the Court after 1937 caused the Court to retreat from
its liberty of contract formula of the rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.

By the time of the New

Deal, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes was willing to
specifically disavow the practice of equating liberty of
contract with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

In 1937, in the case of West Coast Hotel v.

Parrish, the Court upheld a Washington State minimum
wage law for women.

36

The Supreme Court continued a quiet retreat from
the use of economic substantive due process throughout
the New Deal era.

By the time of Ferguson v. Skrupa in

21

1963, the Supreme Court had completely abandoned, Jus
tice Black said, the very concept of substantive due
process as a means to exercise a judicial veto of laws
with which it did not agree.J 7
That strong dismissive language seemed to herald
the end of substantive due process as a tool for judi
cial review of state laws.
full story.

However, that was not the

The Court had also developed a parallel

line of substantive due process cases which were not re
lated to economic issues.

It was from that less well

known line of cases which had not been at the center of
national politics, and the New Deal struggle for control
of the Court, that the modern right of privacy devel
oped.

22
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CHAPTER II
SOCIAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Although a majority of the Supreme Court was will
ing to announce in 1963 that it had rejected the doc
trine of substantive due process, whether that was true
in fact was open to doubt.

The Court had made a series

of decisions shortly after World War I which were not
tagged with the substantive due process label by critics
because they were not directed against economic legisla
tion.

But the Court, in fact, did decide in those cases

what the substance of due process was.
Part of the progressives' critique of the Court
during the first one-half of the twentieth century was
that the state legislatures and Congress should deter
mine what the substance of the law should be.

The Court

should confine itself to enforcement of procedures nec
essary to guarantee due process.

Unfortunately for that

theory, the sometimes ugly passions World War I gener
ated resulted in some state laws which seemed motivated
by hatred for all things German.
Several states, including Nebraska, passed laws re
quiring all schools to teach in the English language,
26
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banning the teaching of any foreign language in any pub
lic or private school below the ninth grade.

The Ne

braska law was challenged by a teacher who was convicted
of teaching German at a Lutheran school.
Relying on a state court ruling that the law al
lowed teaching German outside school hours, the Zion Lu
theran school decided to add one-half an hour to its
noon recess, without a corresponding increase in the
length of the school day.

The local authorities felt

that Zion was pressing the issue too far and the County
Attorney went to the school and observed ten year old
Raymond Parpart reciting Bible lessons in German to his
teacher, Robert Meyers.

1

The teacher was convicted by a jury and fined.

Af

ter raising the issues of a denial of his Fourteenth
Amendment privileges and immunities, as well as due pro
cess and equal protection rights, in the state courts,
and losing, Meyer appealed to the Supreme Court.

In

keeping with legal theory of the day, his brief was
couched in terms of violations of his right to pursue
his vocation as a teacher of German and his right to
freely enter into a contract to teach German.

2

The Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in
1922, lost little time in finding a violation of Meyer's
right to engage in his occupation and struck the Nebras-
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ka law as a violation of his liberty rights under the
due process clause.

Justice James McReynolds, a reac

tionary in economic matters, listed the liberties he be
lieved that clause included as:
the right to contract, to engage in the
common occupations, acquire useful knowledge,
marry, establish a home and bring up children,
worship God and enjoy common law privileges
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.3
Obviously, McReynold's list was not taken verbatim
from the Fourteenth Amendment, although some of the
items were enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.

The

Justice seems to have taken the categories from the
"liberty lists" in the Allgeyer and Lochner cases, ad
ding the right to marry and worship God. His opinion was
written broadly enough to cover the rights of parents,
although they were not parties to the appeal in the
case.

It was also something new in constitutional ju-

risprudence, moving away from the focus on Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process "liberties" as proper
ty rights.
McReynolds followed his Meyer opinion the same year
in the consolidated case titled Bartels v. Iowa, by
striking several other state laws that banned teaching
German or other foreign languages.

The American Legion,

an organization dedicated to "Americanism" and full as
similation, submitted a friend of the court (amicus)
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brief in support of the statutes and in opposition to
briefs of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod and the Roman
Catholic Church, two churches with many non-English
speaking members.

Interestingly, Justice Holmes, a "le

gal realist" who often voted with progressive justices
in opposition to the economic substantive due process
concept expressed in the Lochner case, also refused to
recognize the non-economic substantive due process
claimed here.

He said Iowa's law was a proper exercise

of the state's police power. 4
Those two cases were followed in 1927 by Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.

That case resulted from a challenge

to Oregon's Compulsory Education Act of 1922 that re
quired all children between the ages of eight and six
teen to attend public schools, unless they obtained per
mission of the public school authorities for home
schooling.

The Oregon law was passed as an initiative

bill by the voters after a collection of fraternal
lodges placed it on the ballot.

That statute was not as

directly tied to the passions of World War I, but it
came from a related movement to enforce assimilation
into the mainstream by recent immigrants, particularly
Catholics.

The avowed purpose of supporters of the law

was to mix everyone, rich and poor, in the melting pot
to produce the "True American." 5
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The Oregon law affected all private schools,
sectarian or not, and while the case is commonly cited
only by the name of the first appealing party, the ap
pellants also included a private military school called
Hill Military Academy that had originally been affili
ated with the Protestant Episcopal Church.

The lawyers

for the Society of Sisters argued that the ban on chil
dren attending private schools was a violation of the
property rights of the school run by the sisters.

The

military school joined in that argument.
The Society's lawyers also argued that the statute
unlawfully interfered with the liberties of teachers at
private schools to practice their vocation and to con
tract with the parents.

They were joined in those argu

ments in briefs filed for the American Jewish Committee,
the North Pacific Conference of the Seventh Day Adven
tists and the Foreign Mission Society of the Protestant
Episcopal Church.
The state of Oregon argued that the state's "police
power" was sufficient to require attendance at public
schools.

In an argument foreshadowing later First

Amendment case law, the State Attorney General also ar
gued that "absolute" separation of church and state un
der the First Amendment required public schools to be
free from the influence of a religious organization or
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belief.

Apparently he was either trying to explain that

the public schools would not impose Protestant beliefs
on Catholic pupils, or to imply that it was not ap
propriate to teach religion in schools at all.

He also

made the mistake of arguing that the availability of
public schools ended the need for any other type of
school.

6

McReynolds was not impressed with the argument and
held that parents could decide to give their children a
sectarian education whether the state approved or not.
In that era the usual Fourteenth Amendment analysis
focused on whether the liberty to contract was infringed
upon.

McReynolds did so in this case also, as a type of

afterthought.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, he fol

lowed the rationale of his opinion in the Meyer case
that the liberty of parents to "direct [the] upbringing
and education of children under their control" as they
saw fit was such a fundamental right that the state
could not "force instruction from public teachers." 7
McReynolds' reference to the rights of parents
was not necessary to the decision, given that no parents
were parties in the lawsuit, and it was probably obiter
dictum in this case.

But it did strongly influence the

development of later Fourteenth Amendment analysis in
the area of privacy rights when language from his opin-
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ion was used to argue for a family right to sexual pri
vacy in the 1960s.
That the line of economic substantive due process
based on Lochner came to an end with the arrival of the
New Deal was no surprise given the hostility of New
Dealers and progressives to the Court's use of that doc
trine to invalidate economic labor legislation it dis
agreed with.

There were only a small number of school

ing cases following the Meyer case, compared to the
large number of times the Supreme Court struck state
economic regulatory statutes.

Given that numerical dis

parity, it would be fair to characterize the schooling
cases as aberrations from the usual limitation of sub
stantive due process to liberty of contract analysis.
However, that distinction was not made explicit by the
new Court majority which said, beginning with the case
of Nebia v. New York in 1934, and continuing with West

Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937, that it eschewed the use
of substantive due process in general. 8
There was doubt as to whether it was wise to so re
strict the meaning of the due process and equal protec
tion clauses in the area outside "commercial transac
tions."

Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone voiced that

concern in his famous footnote four in United States v.

Carolene Products Co. in 1938. 9

Stone mentioned
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religion, the political process, racial and other mino
rities, voting and other rights from the Bill of Rights
as deserving a more strict standard of scrutiny when
state laws were reviewed under the due process clause.
In fact, the Court never did repudiate the Meyer,
Bartel, Pierce line of social substantive due process
cases.

They remained on the books as good law, albeit

seldom used because the states had complied with the
spirit of the decisions.

That line of cases would be

revived by the Court in the 1960s when a constitutional
right to contraceptives and abortion was claimed.
There was not much interest by the Vinson Court at
the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early
1950s in free lance expansion of liberty rights.

10

Also,

by that time the Court's emphasis had shifted from ad
hoc determination of what substantive liberties were
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, to "incorpor
ating" specific parts of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause.
The next steps in the development of a constitu
tional right of privacy were taken under the selective
incorporation label.

Most of the Court's selective in

corporation of specific parts of the Bill of Rights was
for procedural rights such as the right to counsel and
to remain silent when accused.

However, enough of the
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process dealt with substantive issues, especially those
dealing with the First Amendment, to keep the Court doc
trinally engaged in substantive due process analysis.
That process eventually produced a substantive right of
privacy under the First and Fourth Amendments.
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CHAPTER III
SELECTIVE INCORPORATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Beginnings of Selective Incorporation
Aware of the controversy over the Supreme Court's
use of the due process clause to strike down labor laws
as violations of liberty of contract, the New Deal Court
was sensitive to criticism that it was merely writing
predilections of its members into the vague language of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

After Justice Owen Roberts

switched his voting pattern to uphold New Deal legisla
tion with his "switch in time" in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish,

the Court scrupulously eschewed using the due

process clause to strike down economic legislation.

It

was less concerned with using the due process clause to
review legislation in noneconomic matters, however.
In the period before the New Deal, the Court had
used the due process clause to destroy the ban on teach
ing German, and the attempt by Oregon to force all ele
mentary students to attend public schools.

Those cases,

however, were exceptions to the rule in that era that
substantive due process was an economic doctrine.
During the era of economic substantive due process,
36
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between 1896 and 1937, the Court in each case listed the
rights believed to be protected from interference by
state laws.

The exact source of those rights was never

made clear by the Court.

They probably were based on a

reading of America's common law traditon by a majority
of justices in a given case.

But the Court never made a

point of following common law precedents as such.

What

was clear was the preferential position in which the
Court placed property rights.

A new basis for determin

ing federal Constitutional rights enforceable against
the states began to emerge during the same decade, the
1920s, in which the Meyer and Pierce cases were decided.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in the case of Gilbert

v. Minnesota in 1920, remarked that, "I cannot believe
that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
includes only the liberty to acquire and to enjoy prop
erty."

However, Justice McKenna, with Justice Holmes

concurring, upheld the conviction of the defendant, Jo
seph Gilbert, for saying at a public meeting that con
scription in World War I was unjust when the people did
not have the opportunity to vote directly on the deci
sion to go to war. 1
In what appears to have been his earliest expres
sion on the Court of a right of privacy, Brandeis said
that the state's absolute prohibition on advocating pac-
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ifism, even in a home, was an invasion of the privacy of
Perhaps because the conviction was not for

the home.

something said in a home, Brandeis could not win over a
majority.

2

In 1925 it was suggested in obiter dictum in the
case of Gitlow v. New York that the Court was prepared
to take another giant step in expanding the meaning of
the due process clause.

3

It had been assumed since rat

ification that the Bill of Rights applied only to the
Federal government.

The Supreme Court had so held in

Barron v. Baltimore in 1833 when it refused to apply the
Fifth Amendment to state or local government action.
The Court made a similiar ruling in 1845 in Permoli v.
New Orleans with respect to the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion clause.

4

However, while the Court in Gitlow upheld the con
viction of Gitlow for criminal anarchy, Justice Edward
Sanford also said that the First Amendment freedoms of
speech and of the press were fundamental "liberties",
protected from state infringement by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

5

In 1927 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, reiterated that the right of privacy was
protected by the Fourth Amendment.

He said the Bill of

Rights gave Americans "the right to be let alone" free
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from "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual." 6
That was a considerable stretch from the meaning
Thomas Cooley attached to his "right to be let alone"
phrase.

In Cooley's treatise on torts, he used the

phrase in the conventional common law sense of a right
to be let alone by other private persons.

In short, it

was a right to be free from assaults and other affronts
to human dignity.

It had nothing to do with a restraint

on the power of the government.
Some of the advocates of the laissez faire liberty
of contract version of substantive due process also re
lied on Cooley as an authority for their theory.

Howev

er, that was based on Cooley's other great work, his

Constitutional Limitations, first published in 1868, the
year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.

That re

liance was also based on a misreading of Cooley's ideas
about the power of the government.

In essence, the ad

vocates for economic substantive due process read more
into Cooley, and the Constitution, than either could
support. 7
Cooley had quite conventional views of the power of
the government.

He also had a great deal of respect for

the commori law tradition as a check on the government as
its basic principles were codified in state and federal
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constitutions.

But there was little in the common law

tradition to support either the economic due process
theory or the Brandeisian concept of a right of privacy.
That did not deter Brandeis from mining Cooley for fe
licitous phrases any more than it had detered the eco
nomic theorists earlier.
In an ironic twist for that era, the majority in

Olmstead rejected the claim of a big business, American
Telephone and Telegraph and other telephone companies,
participating on behalf of Olmstead as amici curiae,
that use of the telephone was a property right that
should not be trespassed upon.
Incorporation of the First Admendment
By 1931, in Near v. Minnesota, the Court was ready
to actually apply the free press clause of the First
Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a
Minnesota law making it a crime to publish a "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical."

The defendant's case was first taken by

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), originally a
pacifist organization founded in 1917 in reaction to the
militarism of World War I.

When Near ran short of

funds, his defense was taken over by the American News
paper Association, which included the Chicago Tribune, a
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conservative paper run by Colonel Robert McCormick, an
ardent opponent of corrupt boss ru�e in Chicago. 8
The Near case marked the beginning of what has been
called absorption, or selective incorporation, of the
Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the Four
teenth Amendment for application to state and local gov
ernment.

That process began even before the Court re

nounced the doctrine of substantive due process.

The

Court did not make a distinction between rights in the
Bill of Rights said to be substantive as compared to
those better classified as procedural. 9 Instead, the fo
cus of the Court was on whether the right being claimed,
to use the formula preferred by Justice Felix Frankfurt
er, was "fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty."
The resemblance of that formula to what the Court
had used to determine what economic "liberties" the due
process clause included is obvious.

Justices Frankfurt

er and Brandeis, and other Justices who shared the pro
gressives' aversion to use of economic substantive due
process by the Court, expressed concern that they were
again importing substance into the Fourteenth Amendment,
by a slightly different method.

They persevered in the

face of their doubts, however. 10
Justice Hugo Black offered the Court a way around
the conceptual difficulty in 1947 with his theory of
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complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment as set out in his dissent, with a
long historical appendix, in Adamson v. California. 11
Black's straight-forward theory, based on his reading of
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, was that the
drafters' intent was to apply the federal Bill of Rights
in full to the states.

If the right was set out in the

Bill of Rights, it should be applied to the states, and
if it was not set out in the Bill of Rights, it should
not be applied to the states.

That would avoid, he be

lieved, the constant need to sift out those rights that
federal courts should force state governments to apply.
Justice Frankfurter and a majority of the rest of
the Court were never convinced that Black's idea was
correct.

Professor Charles Fairman researched the de

bates on the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amend
ment and declared Black's conclusions to be based on
faulty history.

He argued that incorporation of the

Bill of Rights had not been intended.

12

Being unwilling to accept Justice Black's concept,
the Court continued its practice of rummaging in the
dustbin of history and in the members' own political and
ideological proclivities for the meaning of the Four
teenth Amendment's due process clause.

The result was

expansion of due process in three areas: First Amendment
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rights, criminal procedural rights, and social substan
tive rights; and the extinction in practice of the doc
trine of liberty of contract associated with Allgeyer v.
Louisiana and Lochner v. New York.

As Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone had suggested in
1938, although economic substantive due process was out
of favor, the Court was willing to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect First Amendment rights from state

infringement.13

In 1937 the Court struck down a statute

in DeJonge v. Oregon that forbade membership in the Com
munist Party on the grounds that it violated the First
Amendment right to assemble and to petition the govern

ment.14

In 1943, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court
overturned the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for
violating a child labor statute by allowing a child un
der her care to sell religious tracts.

Although such a

statute would have been upheld if challenged on economic
grounds, the late New Deal Court struck the statute on a
First Amendment challenge.15

It is interesting that the

Court made no comment on the theoretical similarity of
this decision, based on substantive rather than proce
dural grounds, to earlier economic substantive cases.
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Strict Scrutiny of a Fundamental Right
Justice Douglas deftly avoided that issue in 1942
in Skinner v. Oklahoma by relying on the equal protec
tion clause.

The unfortunate Skinner was convicted of

armed robbery and sentenced to the penitentiary.

Be

cause the state legislature felt prison time was insuf
ficient punishment for repeat offenders, Skinner was
slated for involuntary sterilization by forcible vasec
tomy.

Not sharing the legislative enthusiasm for that

prospect, he appealed on the grounds the Oklahoma three
strike statute violated the due process and equal
protection clauses.

16

Since the federal Bill of Rights is silent on the
subject of involuntary sterilization, Justice Douglas
was in a quandary if he wished to avoid merely echoing
the substantive due process reasoning of Meyer v.
braska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.

Ne

Both those

cases had ruled the right to raise children was pro
tected by the due process clause, but unlike the rights
the Court was selectively incorporating from the Bill of
Rights, such a right was not found in the Bill of
Rights.

By 1941 the Supreme Court seldom looked to

state common law as a source of substantive rights and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court had already decided the com
mon law in Oklahoma did not protect Skinner's future.

17

Justice Douglas rose to the intellectual challenge and
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opined that the equal protection clause was violated by
Oklahoma's exclusion of embezzlement and political of
fenses from the category of crimes of moral turpitude
when robbery was included.
Why should that make any difference, Oklahoma had
argued.

A legal classification merely needs to be a ra

tional one, not necessarily a classification a given
Court would make given the choice.

Douglas responded

that for such a fundamental right as the right to have
children, the test of rationality is not sufficient.

An

infringement of a fundamental right would be strictly
scrutinized by the Supreme Court.

18

To say that this precursor of the strict scrutiny,
compelling interest test looked remarkably like the
application of substantive due process is to state the
obvious.

Whether it was really an equal protection

case, or a substantive due process case, did not change
the value of the case as a precedent for the Court.

The

New Deal and progressive members on the Court were more
comfortable with analysis which avoided raising the
specter of substantive due process which they said they
had just buried.
After Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court proceeded to
extirpate economic substantive due process, culminating
with Justice Black's majority opinion in Ferguson v.
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Skrupa in 1963.

The Supreme Court remained busy, howev

er, after a brief period of quiescence during the Vinson
years, expanding the reach of its authority over state
law by selective incorporation of the criminal procedur
al rights in the Bill of Rights.
For years the Supreme Court reviewed state court
criminal cases to see if the claimed Constitutional
right was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
To avoid the ambiguity of that approach, Justice Black
argued for incorporation of all the personal rights set
out explicitly in the Bill of Rights, but that never
gained the support of a majority of the Court.

However,

in practice the Warren Court began to base its selective
incorporation decisions closely on the procedural
protections found in the federal Bill of Rights.

19

Incorporation of First and Fourth Amendments
Interestingly, one of the first Warren Court selec
tive incorporation cases based on Fourth Amendment pro
cedural issues was also the first modern selective in
corporation case to revisit the question of whether the
Constitution has a right of privacy.

Justice Brandeis

had earlier posited such a right in the search and sei
zure context in his Olmstead dissent.

In 1961 Justice

Tom Clark ruled that the protection of the Fourth Amend-
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ment against unreasonable searches and seizures applied
to a state court prosecution via the Fourteenth Amend
ment.

He also said that there was a right of privacy in

one's home.

That much would seem obvious, but the facts

of the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio also raised the ques
tion of whether private possession of obscene material
was protected by the Constitution. 20
The police went to the house of Dollree Mapp on a
tip that there was a bomb and gambling material there.
After she refused them entry, the police said they ob
tained a warrant to search the house.

The ensuing

search of the house yielded no bomb or gambling materi
als, but the police did find four obscene books and sev
eral obscene photographs and drawings.

Dollree claimed

that they belonged to a man who had lived in her house,
although the police said they were found in her personal
dresser in her bedroom. 21
She appealed her conviction as a violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights and of her right of privacy.
The ACLU filed a brief for her claiming a constitutional
right of privacy based on both the Fourth and the Four
teenth Amendments.

The brief cited Brande
' is' 1890 Har

vard Law Review article, arguing that his proposed com
mon law right of privacy should apply to the government
as Brandeis had argued in his Olmstead dissent. 22
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Because the prosecution never introduced its search
warrant as evidence during the criminal trial, Justice
Clark ruled that Mapp's right of privacy had been unlaw
fully invaded.

He then invoked the selective incorpora

tion doctrine to apply the exclusionary rule previously
developed in Fourth Amendment litigation in federal
courts to state courts also. 23
With the procedural due process decision in Mapp v.
Ohio, the foundation was completed for the third branch
of the modern constitutional doctrine of a right of pri
vacy.

The first branch was, of course, the social sub

stantive due process doctrine laid down in the Meyer,
Bartels and Pierce cases.

The second, incipient, branch

was the new equal protection theory based on fundamental
rights, or suspect classes, as prefigured by Justice
Douglas' Skinner opinion.

That was related very closely

conceptually to the older social substantive due pro
cess.

The third branch was the selectively incorporated

protections of the Fourth Amendment (like Mapp v. Ohio)
applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the years following the Mapp decision the Su
preme Court decided two other significant cases involv
ing Fourth Amendment claims for an individual's privacy
right against the government.

Stanley v.

Georgia, de

cided in 1969, was similar to Mapp in that it was a
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search of a house for evidence of illegal bookmaking
that instead turned up obscene material in a bedroom.

24

Mapp had already determined that if a search was

illegal, the "fruit" of the illegal search would be ex
cluded from use as evidence in a state court prosecu
tion.

In the interval between the Mapp decision in 1961

and argument of the Stanley case in 1969, the Court had
decided Katz v. United States in 1967.

Katz adopted the

privacy reasoning of Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead
dissent.

Under Justice John Marshall Harlan's adapta

tion of the Brandeis concept in Katz, the focus shifted
from real estate trespass analysis to balancing the rea
sonableness of the expectation of privacy of the accused
against the extent of the government's intrusion.
Stanley gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to
apply that expectation of privacy test to a prosecution
for possession of a pornographic movie with the un
appealing title of Young Blood.

The film had been found

tucked away, still in the film containers, in a drawer
in Stanley's bedroom.

25

The Court majority found the accused had a reason
able expectation of privacy in his house.

Since the po

lice had a valid warrant to search for evidence of gam
bling, there was no procedural violation to justify ex
clusion of the evidence under the exclusionary rule.
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The police had viewed the film after it was seized, and
the jury convicted him, so there was no question that it
was in fact obscene under Georgia law.

The remaining

issue was whether Stanley could be prosecuted for mere
private possession of material which was obscene and so
illegal to possess under state law.

26

Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the major
ity, combined the First Amendment with the Fourth Amend
ment, and for good measure, threw in the "right to be
let alone" that Justice Brandeis had borrowed from Thom
as Cooley, to create a new right of privacy 'based on se
lective incorporation of parts of the Bill of Rights.
In Marshall's words, "the First Amendment means .

a

State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or films he may
watch." 27

That right was clearly substantive, although

Marshall was careful not to characterize it so, in that
it existed even if the search was legal in all respects.
In short, the evidence was not excluded under the exclu
sionary rule because the search was illegal.

It was ex

cluded because the Supreme Court declared the states did
not have the substantive right to make a law declaring
private possession of obscene material illegal.
His brethren, Justices Potter Stewart, William
Brennan and Byron White concurred only in the result,
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pointing out that the search seemed to have exceeded the
scope indicated in the search warrant.28

Stanley appears to be an anomaly in the law of the
constitutional right of privacy, in part because of Mar
shall's unorthodox mixing of First Amendment law with
Fourth Amendment law.

Also, state laws against pornog

raphy have concentrated on regulating its sale and dis
tribution and there has been little attempt to enforce
bans on private possession of such material.

That trend

began years before the Stanley decision, as the lower
court decision in Mapp v. Ohio illustrated.

A majority

of the Ohio Supreme Court in the Mapp case reached the
same result Marshall did in Stanley, but a state proce
dural rule required a supermajority of the court to rule
a state statute unconstitutional.

Because only a simple

majority of the Ohio Court was willing to vote in Mapp's
favor, the constitutional issue remained for federal
consideration.29
The current state of the Fourth Amendment right of
privacy remains tied to traditional conceptions of a
right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures
by state or federal officers in the privacy of a home or
its legal equivalent.

The focus is on the location, not

on the activity being conducted there.

With the excep

tion of the Stanley case, it has little connection to

.

substantive legal issues, unlike the social substantive
due process and equal protection-fundamental rights
branches of the constitutional right of privacy.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT OF FAMILY PRIVACY
The liberty of contract version of economic sub
stantive due process was urged on the Supreme Court by
lawyers for large business interests.

The Court adopted

that legal theory to engage in hostile review of state
economic legislation.

The education cases, Meyer, Bar

tels and Pierce, did not result from an equivalent orga
nized effort by an identifiable part of the Bar.

Some

what coincidentally, one of the big legal guns from the
business world, William Guthrie, did eloquently argue
Pierce to the Supreme Court for the Catholic hierarchy.
But the social substantive due process cases of the
1920s were more a quick reaction by the Court to over
zealous wartime and assimilation laws which stepped too
sharply on religious toes, than they were planned ef
forts to curb state legislatures.
The Supreme Court's use of selective incorporation
to apply the First Amendment to the states resulted in
part from organized efforts by groups such as the ACLU
and the Jehovah's Witnesses to limit state legislation
in the politically sensitive areas of speech and
56
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religion.

By contrast, the selective incorporation of

criminal procedural rights in the Warren Court era was
driven more by the desire of that Court to change the
sometimes cavalier way states treated criminal defen
dants.
The driving force in the development of the new
equal protection theory was the civil rights movement
and the groups actively working for social, political
and legal change in race relations.

Thurgood Marshall,

before President Johnson recruited him for Solicitor
General, was a virtual one man army in that long legal
campaign.

By the 1960s women's groups joined that ef

fort, also.
The civil rights movement, the women's movement and
the general social ferment in society in the 1960s gen
erated a sense that the federal courts, especially the
Supreme Court, were open to arguments for change.

Un

like the era of laissez faire and substantive economic
due process, the modern attack mounted by lawyers
against state legislation was not a conservative reac
tion against activist state legislatures passing popular
laws regulating property rights.

The attack was rather

against laws regulating social and sexual behavior which
had been on the books for generations, but which some
activists now saw as antiquated.
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The selectively incorporated criminal procedural
rights were already applicable to cases in federal
courts, and the Supreme Court had only to look to the
current federal practice for practical guidance in
application of the same rights to state courts.

But the

cases brought by those who wanted to change social leg
islation for contraception and abortion did not involve
questions covered explicitly by the Bill of Rights.

The

challenge for the reformers was to develop new legal
theories of sufficient legal weight to reprise the suc
cess the business community enjoyed in the era of lais
sez faire, and the success the civil rights movement had
with the Warren Court.

The first legal success by re

formers in the field of sexuality and reproduction de
veloped from a long running campaign to make distribu
tion and use of contraceptives legal in the state of
Connecticut.
Contraception
Connecticut had a law against the sale and use of
contraceptives, promoted during the late 1870s by Phi
neas T. Barnum, of circus fame, while he was chairman of
the Connecticut Legislature's Joint Committee on Temper
ance. The law was passed as part of the national anti
pornography, anti-contraception and anti-abortion cru-
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sade of Anthony Comstock and his Society for the Sup
pression of Vice.

Having been enacted by a Republican

Congregational Yankee establishment, it was kept on the
books by the modern Democratic Catholic political struc
ture.2
The Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut cam
paigned throughout the 1940s and 1950s, without success,
for legislative repeal of the state's ban on distribu
tion and use of contraceptives.

Failing to achieve that

objective, they began to force a prosecution so a test
case could be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The local

prosecutors were loath to oblige and the first effort to
mount an appeal to the Supreme Court in 1943 in Tileston

v. Ullman was dismissed for lack of justicability.

3

Likewise, in 1961 Poe v. Ullman was dismissed after oral
argument on Justice Frankfurter's finding of a lack of a
real legal controversy. 4

A small note of hope for the

reformers was Justice Harlan's willingness in dissent to
include the right of married persons to use contracep
tives in the list of substantive liberties protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The Supreme Court did not hear another Connecticut
test case until 1964.

The Executive Director of the

Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, Estelle Gri
swold, widow of the former President of Yale University,
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Whitney Griswold, and Dr. Lee Buxton, a Yale Medical
School professor, finally succeeded in being charged
with distribution of contraceptives to certain unnamed
married persons.

Although guilty of the offense, th�y

pled not guilty and �ere willingly convicted so the law
could be attacked on appeal.
Connecticut's Supreme Court of Errors duly found
them guilty in 1962 and the ACLU took their federal ap
peal.

The state attorneys for Connecticut were not

strong advocates for the law since they shared the opin
ion of many that the law was outmoded, unenforceable and
remained on the books merely because state legislators
lacked the political courage to repeal it.

6

A majority

of the Supreme Court agreed and in 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut, struck the law as a violation of the priva
cy of married couples under several provisions of the
Bill of Rights.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion was a legal won
der, relying on "penumbras" formed from "emanations" of
the personal rights found in the Bill of Rights.

Doug

las specifically disavowed the right of the Supreme
Court to sit as a "super-legislature" for laws touching
"economic problems, business affairs, or social condi
tions."

It would do so, he implied, only for laws oper

ating "directly on an intimate relation of husband and
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wife." 7

He cited Meyer, Pierce and NAACP v.

Alabama, a

1958 First Amendment case, as indications the First
Amendment has peripheral rights, or as he put it, "a
penumbra", protecting marital privacy from government
intrusion.

8

Douglas also relied on the Third, Fourth,

Fifth and Ninth Amendments without grounding the new
right on any particular Amendment.

9

Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Arthur
Goldberg and William Brennan, in a concurring opinion,
agreed with Douglas.

They relied on the selective in

corporation of the personal rights protected by the
first eight Amendments, and on the Ninth Amendment as a
reservation of rights to the people in addition to those
explicitly set out in the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Justice Harlan also concurred, but was willing, as he
had been earlier in Poe v. Ullmann, to rely on what he
called "basic values implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," whether those rights were set out in the Bill
of Rights, or not. 10

Justice Byron White also con

curred, citing Meyer, Pierce, Skinner, and Prince v.
Massachusetts, a 1944 First Amendment case, for the
proposition that the intimacies of married life should
be free from such state regulation. 11
Justices Black and Potter Stewart dissented, saying
there was no constitutional right of privacy against
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state laws.

Black pointed out the parallel between the

Griswold majority's reasoning and that used in the eco
nomic substantive due process cases of Lochner, Coppage
v. Kansas and Adkins v. Children's Hospital.

12

He also

noted the similarity to the social substantive due pro
cess theory Justice McReynolds used in his Meyer and
Pierce opinions.

Justice Black sardonically concluded

with the comment of Judge Learned Hand that:
For myself it would be most irksome to be
ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even
if I knew how to choose them, which I assur
edly do not.13
The Griswold decision was initially of more
theoretical interest than an instrument of national
change since the Connecticut statute struck down was the
only one in the country forbidding use of contraceptives
by married couples.14

The badly fractured doctrinal ba

sis of the case also raised many questions as to what
the decision meant.
In 1972 the Supreme Court moved further, striking a
Massachusetts statute that banned distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.

In Eisenstadt v.

Baird, Justice Brennan avoided the doctrinal ambiguity
of Griswold by relying on Griswold's holding rather than
its theory and finding the Massachusetts statute vio
lated the equal protection clause.

In short, unmarried

people had the same constitutional right to obtain con-
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traceptives as married persons and the state legislature
could not say otherwise.

15

That begged the question of whether the right of
unmarried persons to obtain contraceptives was a consti
tutional right at all, but by that time the new equal
protection doctrine was a powerful and malleable tool
for changing constitutional law.

In 1967 that power had

been demonstrated in Loving v. Virginia.

16

Right to Marry
In that case Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter left
their home state of Virginia to marry.

They had to

leave the state to do so because he was white and she
was not and Virginia forbade marriage between a white
person and a person of another race.

On their return to

Virginia in 1958 they were arrested, convicted and sen
tenced to a year in jail, unless they agreed to leave
the county for twenty-five years.

By the time their ap

peal reached the Supreme Court in 1966, social condi
tions in the United States had changed somewhat from
what they had been in 1958, and a great deal from what
they were in 1691 when the original anti-miscegenation
law was passed in Virginia.

17

The constitutional issue was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment protected a private decision to marry a person
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of another race from state prohibition.

The attorneys

for Virginia pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment
had its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Freedman's Bureau Bill and argued strenuously that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to abolish anti
miscegenation laws.

In their brief they quoted direct

statements made by Senators Lyman Trumball of Illinois
and C.E. Phelps of Maryland during debate on the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau Bill that
such state laws would not be affected by the federal
statutes.

They also pointed out that none of the rati

fying states with such laws on the books when they rati
fied the Fourteenth Amendment changed them after the
Amendment was adopted.

They capped their brief with ex

isting state case law upholding anti-miscegenation
laws.

18

Virginia's position was also opposed by the Catho
lic Conference, the Japanese American Citizens League
and the NAACP.

The technical point of law in the case

was the equal punishment theory which said that if both
partners in such a marriage were punished-equally, there
was no denial of equal protection.

That legal theory,

dating back to the end of Reconstruction, had been re
jected by the Supreme Court shortly before in McLaughlin

v. Florida.19
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Chief Justice Warren wasted little time in striking
Virginia's 1924 version of its Racial Integrity Act, a
direct successor of the 1691 version, which he pointed
out had been revised during a period of nativism after
World War I.

He relied on the equal protection clause,

but, in addition, found a due process denial of a funda
mental freedom, the right to marry the person of one's
choice.
In addition to illustrating Warren's penchant for
trying to do the right thing without much regard for
technical niceties, Loving v. Virginia also showed how
constitutional law sometimes changes with changing so
cial conditions.

By the time Loving was decided, a ma

jority of the nation had reached consensus on civil
rights issues in matters of race.

The decision did not

engender widespread popular protest and there was no
movement in the Congress to repeal the decision by a
Constitutional amendment, or otherwise.
The case is noteworthy for the Court's rejection of
arguments for original intent based on actual undisputed
statements made by prominent political participants in
the Reconstruction era debates.

It is also noteworthy

for the Court's rejection of original intent arguments
based on the prevalent practice of the states before,
during, and after the ratification of the Fourteenth
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Amendment.
The doctrinal tool used by Warren was the compel
ling inter.est test which forced Virginia to convince the
court that its law advanced a state interest more com
pelling than the fundamental right of a person to chose
a spouse.

But the case was more than that.

It was also

an explicit rejection of the theory of white supremacy
by the Court, even though the evidence that such a
theory was the prevailing norm at the time the Civil War
Amendments were adopted was not disputed. 20
By the early 1970s the focus had turned from the
fairly narrow family right of privacy, a departure first
apparent in the Eisenstadt decision, to the twin ques
tions of what the new right of privacy covered and who
it protected from state regulation.

In short, was it a

family right of privacy, or was it a sexual right of
privacy?

The next challenge, to state laws regulating

abortion, raised both those issues.
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CHAPTER V
ROE v. WADE

Legislative Abortion Reform
The Connecticut reformers responsible for Griswold,
and their counterparts in other states, understood that
the case had little practical impact on national poli
cies because the Connecticut law stood alone in its ban
on the use of contraceptives by mature, married adults.
However, they were also aware of the theoretical possi
bilities raised by the Supreme Court's analysis.
Thomas Emerson, Griswold's counsel at oral argument
of the Griswold case, said in his brief, and at oral ar
gument under questioning by the justices, that he was
not arguing for extending a right of privacy to abortion
cases.

Abortion was not like contraception, he said, it

was not a private act in the family home, it was a pub
lic act which ended a life in being.

That position was

in line with Planned Parenthood's current policy of
avoiding linkage to the movement to reform abortion
laws, hoping to avoid political damage to their then
paramount mission of providing contraceptive information
and advice.1
69
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Emerson had been careful in his brief and in oral
argument not to get too far ahead of the Court, but the
analytical basis of the Griswold decision opened the
possibility of other changes in related areas.

His ar

gument to the Court that abortion was a different ques
tion from contraception was revealed as disingenuous
when he shortly thereafter wrote an article in the Mich
igan Law Review suggesting application of the Griswold
privacy rationale to abortion laws.

That article was

read and appreciated by a young law student, Spurgeon
LeRoy Lucas, son of a Baptist deacon from Columbia,
South Carolina.

2

Roy Lucas, as he preferred to be called, was study
ing at New York University Law School in 1965 when the
Griswold decision was announced.

While he was still a

law student his girl friend became pregnant and they
were referred to Dr. Alan Guttmacher who recommended
they go to Puerto Rico to obtain an abortion for her.
Lucas felt the entire experience of traveling out of the
country was unnecessarily degrading and resolved to do
something to change the situation.3
He wrote a senior paper on abortion, which he later
expanded to a substantial law review article, complete
with statistical and sociological analysis.

His then

revolutionary article focused on the best way to use the
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reasoning of the Supreme Court in Griswold to argue for
a constitutional ban on state regulation of abortion.

4

The emphasis of activists trying to liberalize
abortion laws then was on lobbying legislatures to pass
laws allowing more legal reasons for abortions.

Many of

the abortion laws at that time banned abortion except to
save the life or health of the mother.

Three states,

Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania had no statu
tory exceptions, but the state courts had read a life of
the mother exception into the statutes.

Some other

states even required the mother or the doctor to prove
the procedure was medically necessary.

5

The difficulties with state abortion laws
gone unnoticed by lawyers.

had not

The American Law Institute

(ALI), an organization of lawyers and judges represent
ing all states, who met regularly to develop uniform
laws for the states to adopt, set about developing a
model code for abortion, too.

At its 1959 meeting at

the Harvard Club in New York City the ALI endorsed a
model penal law expanding the allowed reasons for a le
gal abortion to include therapeutic abortions for im
pairment of physical or mental health of the mother, fe
tal defects, or pregnancies resulting from rape or in
cest.
It took some time for that proposal to percolate
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through the system, but by 1966 the New York Obstetri
cians Society was ready to endorse the concept.

The

following year the House of Delegates of the American
Medical Association (AMA), in a major reversal of a
nearly century old position, voted to endorse that stan
dard.6
Change was also under way in the mainline Protes
tant churches, which had previously opposed abortion and
had constituted the unofficial establishment when the
laws banning abortion were passed in the 1800s.

In 1962

the Presbyterians urged that state laws allow for thera
peutic abortions and that state laws be made more uni
form.

Bishop Pike of the Episcopal Church and Cardinal

McIntyre engaged in a verbal donnybrook in 1966 when the
California Medical Association endorsed an ALI style
law.

Pike, a former Catholic, was, of course, for the

change and the Cardinal was adamantly opposed. 7
Early in 1967 a group of mainline Protestant and
Jewish clergy in New York City went considerably further
and formed a group they called the Clergymen's Consulta
tion Service on Abortion.

They began to counsel preg

nant women and to refer them to abortionists in coun
tries where the procedure was legal.

The group soon ran

into trouble for allegedly referring women to illegal
abortionists in the state, but they emerged from that

73

imbroglio to become a national group.

8

At the time the movement to liberalize state abor
tion laws represented a substantial change, but at its
second annual convention the newly formed National Orga
nization of Women (NOW) endorsed Betty Friedan's propos
al to instead work for repeal of all abortion laws.

The

National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws
(NARAL) was formed to accomplish just that goal in 1969.
By 1970 the AMA, on a vote of one hundred three to
seventy-three, endorsed abortions for social and econom
ic reasons.

That was essentially a repeal position,

more liberal than the ALI proposed model law and of
forty-seven state laws at that time.

The Methodist

Church also passed a resolution in support of the repeal
position in April, 1970. 9
The lawyers lagged behind, but by 1972 the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates was ready to vote
two hundred seventy-seven to thirty for allowing abor
tions freely during the first twenty weeks of fetal
life.

After that, the ALI standards allowing exceptions

to the ban for physical and mental health, plus rape and
incest, would apply.10

Judicial Coup
Lucas, who had watched the British change their na-
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tional policy with one Parliamentary bill while he was
visiting Britain on a post graduate fellowship, felt he
had found an even faster and better way to change the
law in America.

He told the ACLU and the Association

for the Study of Abortion (ASA) that a declaratory judg
ment action before a three judge panel in federal court
was the best way to proceed.

In short, rather than en

gage in a long and expensive campaign to lobby fifty
state legislatures to either change or repeal their ex
isting laws banning abortion, the Supreme Court could be
petitioned to strike those laws with one decision.

11

The New York chapter of the ASA took up several ap
peals against the New York abortion law.

Lucas partici

pated in those cases but the subsequent legislative re
peal of the entire New York statute mooted his best
case, Hall

v.

Lefkowitz, because the new statute had

none of the features he argued were unconstitutional.

12

Meanwhile, a case was being developed in Texas by two
women also just out of law school.
Sarah Weddington, daughter of a Methodist minister
and a school teacher, and her friend, Linda Coffee, be
cam� active in Dallas, Texas in the effort to reform the
state's 1854 abortion law which allowed abortion only to
save the life of the mother.

Weddington had a personal

interest in that law since she had become pregnant at
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age twenty-two while still an unmarried student.

Ron

Weddington, later her husband for six years, accompanied
her across the border to Piedras Negras, Mexico, for an
abortion.

She found the experience humiliating and re

solved that she would work to change the law.

13

Because of the dismissals for lack of a legal con
troversy experienced by Planned Parenthood of Connecti
cut in its campaign to strike Connecticut's ban on con
traceptives, Weddington and Coffee were determined to
avoid the same fate for their planned case. They
searched for a woman who was actually pregnant to be
their plaintiff, instead of filing their case with only
a doctor willing to do abortions, or with an interest
group as the plaintiff.

They were introduced to Norma

McCovy who said she was pregnant by a boyfriend but
could not afford a child.

After consideration, Norma

McCovy agreed to become the plaintiff, together with
James Hallford, a physician, and a young married couple.
The complaint asking for declaratory and injunctive
relief was filed in Federal District Court for the
Northern District in Dallas and was assigned to a three
judge panel including District Judges Irving Goldberg
and Sarah Hughes (famous for swearing Lyndon Johnson in
as President) and Circuit Judge William Taylor.

The

panel was a good one from a plaintiff's perspective
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since Linda Coffee had recently clerked for Judge Hughes
and the same panel had recently ruled the Texas sodomy
statute was unconstitutionally vague in Buchanan v.

Batchelor, a 1970 case also filed as a declaratory judg
ment action.1•
The Plaintiffs in Roe v. Wade claimed the Texas
abortion statute was a violation of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and the Fourteenth Amendments.

The

case was disposed of by the three judge panel at a com
bined hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for summary disposi
tion and the State's motion to dismiss.

No evidentiary

hearing or trial was required by the three judge panel.
The evidence in the case consisted of the affidavit of
Norma McCovy filed as a Jane Roe affidavit the day be
fore the hearing and several affidavits by medical doc
tors.

Norma was then eight months pregnant.

Coffee and

Weddington, who was arguing her first contested case,
argued for the Plaintiffs' and Jay Floyd, Assistant At
torney General, and John Tolle, of the District Attor
ney's office, argued for the State at the May 22, 1970

hearing.15

In her opinion, released less than 30 days after the
motion hearing, Judge Hughes found the 1854 Texas abor
tion law forbidding abortions, except to save the life
of the mother, void for vagueness under the Fourteenth
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Amendment, and also a violation of the Ninth Amendment.
However, while granting Plaintiffs' request for a decla
ration that the Texas abortion law was unconstitutional,
the panel denied the requested injunctive relief.

That,

together with the District Attorney's public statement
that prosecutions would continue for abortions, allowed
the case to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court,
bypassing a hearing by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals.16
Another case was being heard at the same time in
Georgia where a reform statute based on the ALI Model
Penal Code was challenged.

That statute allowed abor

tions where the life or health of the mother was threat
ened, the fetus might be defective, or the pregnancy re
sulted from rape.

In Doe v. Bolton the state also

raised the question of fetal rights, particularly the
issue of whether a fetus was a person under the Four
teenth Amendment and thus entitled to legal protection
from the moment of conception.17

Under that analysis

the issue became one of balancing the competing due pro
cess rights of two Fourteenth Amendment "persons", rath
er than an issue of the right of a pregnant mother to be
let alone by the state.
In a rather unusual development, Ferdinand Buckley
petitioned to be appointed guardian ad !item for Plain-
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tiff Mary Doe's unborn child.

The three judge panel

initially granted his petition, then denied it, saying
they did not consider the fetus to be a "new being with
federal constitutional rights at any time during gesta
tion."

The fact that he filed a civil
rights counter
.

complaint on behalf of the fetus alleging a conspiracy
to deprive the fetus of its constitutional rights prob
ably was a factor in the decision to limit him to amicus
status.

The judges did allow Buckley to participate in

the case in an amicus capacity and Buckley argued the
fetus was a constitutional person at the District Court
level.

18

Circuit Judge Lewis Morgan and District Judges
Sidney Smith and Albert Herderson found Georgia's reform
law unconstitutional for overbreadth for listing the al
lowable reasons.

Like the Roe case, Doe v. Bolton was

appealed directly to the Supreme Court by the Plain
tiffs.
The Texas and Georgia cases were not the only pend
ing federal court challenges to state abortion laws, nor
was Doe v. Bolton the only case where the issue of a fe
tus as a Fourteenth Amendment person was raised.

In

Montana v. Rogers, a 1960 federal case, the question was
asked whether a person could become a citizen because he
was in utero while his mother was in the United States,.
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although he was born in Italy.

The answer was no.

Be

cause the Supreme Court has differentiated between citi
zenship and personhood in Fourteenth Amendment analysis,
that case left open the question of whether a fetus
could be a constitutional person. 19
In 1970 a three judge panel implied that a fetus
could be a constitutional person.

District Judge Don

Young and Circuit Judge Wieck ruled in Steinberg v.

Brown that the Ohio abortion statute was constitutional
because the right of a fetus, or embryo, was superior to
the right of a woman to destroy it by an abortion, ex
cept in a life threatening situation.

Judge Young said

that the beginning of biological life, at fertilization,
was the point at which a state could begin to regulate a
pregnancy.

20

In Corkey v. Edwards, a 1971 case, another three
judge panel said abortion was the destruction of a human
organism and so could be regulated.

The judges specifi

cally rejected equating Cooley's "right to be let alone"
formulation, as quoted by Justice Brandeis in his Olm

stead dissent, with a constitutional right of privacy.
They also said ruling otherwise would be excessive judi
cial interference since they saw no "real distinction"
between "social due process" and the discredited Lochner
economic substantive due process.

21
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Not all federal judges agreed with those panels.
In 1972 Judges Foreman and Barlow applied the compelling
interest test of Bates v. Little Rock to strike New
Jersey's abortion statute in YMCA v. Kugler.

The stat

ute violated the right of privacy under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments, they said.

However, Judge Garth

in dissent said the state's interest in the fetus began
at conception. 22
By the time the Roe and Doe cases reached the Su
preme Court, the score stood at six to seven in the low
er federal courts.

Abortion statutes in Minnesota, Lou

isiana, Missouri, Ohio, North Carolina and Utah had been
upheld.

In Kansas, New Jersey, Georgia, Texas, Wiscon-

sin, Illinois and Connecticut federal judges had ruled
the statutes unconstitutional.

In California, the state

Supreme Court had ruled that state's abortion law uncon
stitutional under both the California Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 23
The time period during which the Roe and Doe cases
were working their way to the Supreme Court was a time
of national political turmoil.

At the end of Lyndon

Johnson's administration, it was clear the next Presi
dent would not be sympathetic to liberal causes and
Chief Justice Earl Warren informed President Johnson he
wanted to retire from the Court.

Johnson decided to
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for promotion to Chief Justice.
plan, Fortas was rejected.

Unfortunately for that

Worse followed for him and

he was soon forced to resign from the Court because of
questionable dealings with financier Louis Wolfson.
The 1968 Presidential election was won by Richard
Nixon and liberals saw with dismay that the new Presi
dent would begin his term with an unusual opportunity to
appoint both the Chief Justice and a replacement for
Fortas, both liberals by any definition.

Nixon nomi

nated Warren Burger for the Chief Justice slot and he
was easily confirmed.

After the failure of Nixon nomi

nees Judge Clement Haynsworth and Judge G. Harold Cars
well to win Senate confirmation to replace Fortas, Burg
er had the opportunity to recommend the appointment of
his childhood friend, Harry Blackmun, another Republican
federal judge also from Minnesota. 24
By the time oral arguments were heard in the Roe
and Doe cases, Earl Warren and Fortas had been replaced
by Nixon appointees.

Since President Nixon had indi

cated in his campaign that he favored strict construc
tion of the Constitution, and also that he did not favor
repeal or liberalization of state abortion laws, the new
appointees were not considered likely to be sympathetic
to extension of the Griswold right of privacy.

25
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The briefing in the Roe and Doe cases was impres
sive.

In addition to the briefs by plaintiffs' counsel,

and by the state Attorneys General, sixteen friend of
the court briefs were also submitted.

Nine favored

striking abortion laws and seven wanted them retained.
One of the several financial angels for the Roe case,
Jimmye Kimmey, of ASA, with funding from John D. Rocke
feller, III, and Cordelia Scaife May, among others,
coordinated the amicus briefs on behalf of the plain
tiffs arguing for a constitutional right to an
abortion. 26
Meanwhile Sarah Weddington had signed on with Roy
Lucas as a staff attorney at his new organization, the
James Madison Institute, financed by Martin Dies, an at
torney famous for his work in civil rights cases who had
ready money from a recent business success.

As the

plaintiffs' brief in the Roe case was being drafted,
tension developed between Weddington and Lucas which
caused her to quit the Institute and return to Dallas
with her attorney husband.

It later became a point of

contention between them, but the Roe brief was organized
along the lines Lucas had envisaged in his law review
article. 27
The thrust of the argument was that there is a zone
of privacy for matters closely related to the intimacies
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of sex.

Plaintiffs relied on the earlier social sub

stantive due process cases of Meyer, Bartels, and
Pierce, as well as the more recent privacy cases such as
Skinner, Poe v. Ullman, Griswold and Loving v.
ia.

Virgin

They also cited a law review article by recently

retired Justice Tom Clark suggesting it was time to re
form abortion laws to bring them in line with modern
times.28

Some of the amicus briefs made much more esoteric
arguments.

The brief by the Friends Service Committee

and the Methodists suggested it was improper for a state
to rely on religious morality to show a compelling state
interest justifying a ban on abortion.

Another brief

suggested it was cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to force a pregnancy to term.

Overall

they alternately cited original intent, or said it did
not matter, as they felt appropriate to the particular
argument at hand.29
The amicus briefs for the other side focused pri
marily on the question of whether an unborn child was a
Fourth Amendment person (the word fetus was used very
sparingly).

Interestingly, none of the briefs, even

those by Catholic organizations, attacked Griswold and
the right of privacy that case guaranteed married cou
ples even though it was obvious the plaintiffs' case de-
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pended on the right of sexual privacy suggested by that
case.30

By the time of oral arguments, Lucas had been dis
placed from the case and Weddington argued on behalf of
the plaintiffs.
as.

Jay Floyd argued for the state of Tex

Weddington clearly had the better of the first oral

argument, in part because the justices seemed more sym
pathetic to her position than to that of the State.

She

also, neophyte that she was, simply put in a better per
formance.31
The Texas statute was of 1854 vintage and allowed
abortion only to save the life of the mother.

The Geor

gia statute was a recent reform law based on the ALI
model penal statute.

Because of those differences, it

had been thought before the cases were argued that the
Georgia law was more likely to meet with the approval of
the Supreme Court.

But it was clear after the post ar

gument conference that a majority of the justices fa
vored striking both the Texas and Georgia abortion stat
utes.32
That was a somewhat startling development for new
Chief Justice Burger and he arranged for the case to be
reargued because two new members had just been appointed
to the Court to replace Justices Hugo Black and John
Marshall Harlan.

Apparently he hoped the two additional

85

Nixon appointees would be less sympathetic to an opinion
striking abortion laws wholesale.

Newly appointed Jus

tice Lewis Powell had the reputation of being a main
stream conservative and Justice William Rehnquist came
straight to the court from the Nixon Justice Department.
The reargument turned out to be anti-climactic and ulti
mately made no difference in the voting since Rehnquist
voted against striking the abortion statutes and Powell
voted to strike the laws.
Burger apparently voted to strike the Texas law
only when he saw there were sufficient votes without him
so Douglas, the senior justice in the majority, would
not assign the opinion, and not because he really fa
vored striking abortion laws.

Burger then assigned the

case to his old friend, Justice Blackmun, an establish
ment Republican and Presbyterian.

With encouragement

from Douglas and Brennan, Blackmun labored slowly over
his opinion, eventually producing the famous, or perhaps
infamous, Roe v. Wade decision. 33
The Roe decision overturned the abortion laws of
all but five states at one stroke.

The laws in thirty

one states were completely invalidated and another fif
teen reform style laws required extensive revision.
Only Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington already had
so-called repeal laws on the books which met the test of
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Roe. 34
Blackmun's opinion specifically rejected the argu
ment of the attorneys for Texas and Georgia, and the
briefs of Americans United for Life, the Texas Diocesen
Attorneys Association, and Women for the Unborn, that a
fetus is a constitutional person covered by the Four
teenth Amendment prohibition on depriving any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Instead, said Blackmun, "the word 'person,' used in the

Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."35

Blackmun focused on the effect of state abortion
laws on pregnant women, finding women to be protected by
a constitutional right of privacy based on the Four
teenth Amendment.

However, while that right of privacy

was fundamental, it was not absolute, he said.
divided pregnancy into three trimesters.

He then

During the

first trimester the state could not prohibit a woman
from getting an abortion for any reason, or no reason.
In the second trimester the state could regulate abor
tion to protect maternal health.

By the third trimes

ter, and viability of the fetus outside the womb, the
state's interest in the ''potential life" was sufficient
ly compelling that abortions could be prohibited except
to save the life or health of the mother.36
Justice Stewart reversed his stance in Griswold and
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concurred with Blackmun, saying the decision was in ac
cord with the line of social substantive due process
cases beginning with the Meyer and Pierce cases.

Rehn

quist dissented on the grounds that abortions were not
covered by a right of privacy, nor was abortion within
the tradition of liberties protected from government in
terference.
cess right.J7

In short, it was not a substantive due pro

88
Chapter V Endnotes
1 David

J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right
to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (NY: Macmillan
Pub. Co., 1994), 280; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), microfiche ed., (Washington, D.C.: Microcard
Editions, Inc.), Griswold's Brief 89; Phillip B. Kurland
and Gerhard Casper, eds., Landmark Briefs and Arguments
of the Supreme Court of the United ·states: Constitution
al Law, vol. 61 (Bethesda, MD: University Publications
of America, 1993), Oral Argument 452.
Kurland, Oral Argument 452; Thomas I. Emerson,
"Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine," Michigan Law
Review 64, No. 2 (December, 1965): 219-234; Garrow,
337.
2

Garrow, 336; Linda J. Greenhouse, "Constitutional
Question: Is There A Right to Abortion?" New York
Times, 24 Jan 1970, 3; Dr. Alan Guttenmacher was the
President of Planned Parenthood Federation of America
and one of the prime movers in getting that organization
into the abortion field.
3

Roy Lucas, "Federal Constitutional Limitations on
the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion
Statutes," North Carolina Law Review 46, No. 4 (June,
1968): 730-738.
4

19.

5 "Mother,

Rebuffed," New York Times, 1 August 1962,

Garrow, 277; "Obstetricians Back New Abortion
Law," New York Times, 20 Jul 1966, 83; Donald Janson,
"AMA in Reversal, Favors Liberalizing of Abortion Laws,"
New York Times, 22 June 1967, 1, 79.
6

"New Group Will Seek Changes in Abortion Law," New
York Times, 17 February 1969, 32; George Dugan, "Presby
terians Vote to Provide Pre-marriage Sex Education," New
York Times 23 May 1962, 35; "Clerics on Coast in Abortion Clash," New York Times 24 September 1966, 19.
7

Edward B. Fiske, "Clergymen Offer Abortion Ad
vice," New York Times, 22 May 1967, 1, 36; "Roberts In
vestigating After Raid On Local Abortionists," New York
Times 26 May 1969, 17; Sarah Weddington, A Question of
Choice (NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1992), 31; Garrow, 364.
8

89
"New Group Will Seek Changes in Abortion Laws,"
New York Times, 17 February 1969, 32; Richard D. Lyons,
"A.M.A. Eases Abortion Rules: City Health Unit Expands
1 •
Plan," New York Times 26 June 1970,
1, 24; "Methodists
Vote $4 Million for Aid to Minorities," New York Times
25 April 1970, 59.
9

II

°Fred Graham, "Bar Group Supports Eased Abortion,"
New York Times, 8 February 1972, 37".
1

11Garrow,

336, 342, 351, 366.

12

Ibid., 421; Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030

13

Weddington, 11, 12, 13, 14.

( S . D . NY, 1 9 6 9 ) •

Garrow, 398, 436; Roy M. Mersky and Gary R.
Hartman, eds., A Documentary History of the Legal As
pects of Abortion in the United States: Roe v. Wade,
vol. 1 (Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1993),
\
Weddington preface xiv, xv; Buchanan
v. Batchelor, 308
F. Supp. 782 (N.D. TX, 1970).
14

• I
439; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
microfiche ed. (Washington, D.C.: Microcard Editions,
Inc.), Transcript, 77; Weddington, 44.

15 Garrow,

16 Roe, microfiche ed., 123; Roe v.
Wade, 314 F.
Supp. 1217 (N.D. TX, 1970); Weddington, 69.

17 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), microfiche
ed. (Washington, D.C.: Microcard Editions, Inc.), Tran
.,_
• 1 F. Supp. 1048
script, 123, 153, 155; Doe v. Bolton, 319
(N.D • GA, 1 9 7 0 ) •

lBibid., 1055, footnote 3.
19

Montana v. Rogers, 278 F 2d 68 (1960).

20

Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. OH,

21

Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. NC,

1970).
1971).

Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); YMCA
v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (1972).
22

90
23Garrow, 482.
24Louis M. Kohlmeier, Jr., God Save This Honorable
Court (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 81-89, 98102, 115, 139, 140, 159, 160; Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (NY:
Simon & Schuster, 1979), 86.
"President Opposes Unlimited· Abortion," New York
Times, 4 April 1971, 1, 28; "President Supports Repeal
of State Law On Abortion," New York Times 7 May 1972, 1.
25

26Weddington, 91, 104; Mersky, vols. 2 and 3; Doe
v. Bolton, microfiche ed. (Washington, D.C.: Microcard
Editions, Inc.).

27Garrow, 500-501; Marian Faux, Roe v. Wade, the
Untold Story of the Landmark Supreme Court Decision That
Made Abortion Legal (New York: Macmillian Publishing
Company, 1988), 216, 219-223, 229-236.

28Mersky, Plaintiff's Brief, 186, 227; Tom C.
Clark, "Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitu
tional Appraisal," Loyola University Law Review 2
(1969): 1-11; former Justice Clark did say the change
should be accomplished legislatively, not by the judi
ciary.
29 Mersky,

vol. 2.

JOJbid., vol.

3.

31Weddington, 119, 139; Mersky, vol. 3, 451.

32Woodward, 174, 185.

33Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the
Burger Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),
87-89, 149; Woodward, 172; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
34 "Effect of Ruling on State's Laws,"
Times, 23 Jan 1969, 20.
35

New York

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 158 (1973).

36Jbid., 164, 165.

J7Jbid., 167-171, 171-178.

CHAPTER VI
REACTION TO ROE V. WADE
Reaction to the decision in Roe v. Wade was strong,
swift, and dependant on political and religious predis
position.

NARAL, the ACLU, ASA and other groups that

had been crusading for the change were elated.

Liberal

Protestant religious organizations and publications
hailed the decision.

Many politicians were relieved,

whether they dared express that emotion or not, that the
issue seemed to have been removed from the political
arena where they were forced to deal with it.

1

Religious Reaction
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, on the other
hand, was shocked and said so emphatically.

Conserva

tive and traditionalist Protestants, although less prom
inently involved with the issue, were also strongly
against the decision.

The editors of Christianity Today

came straight to the point and said the Court had em
braced paganism, alluding to the classical pagan prac
tice of infanticide.

2

The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE),
91
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which had not taken a strong position on abortion before
the Roe decision, issued a statement in 1973 specifical
ly reacting to the case.

The statement said the deci

sion was deplorable because it allowed abortion for per
sonal convenience and was morally wrong.

The NAE said

it would, however, recognize the need for abortion when
medically necessary and in cases of rape and incest, but
only after counseling with the mother for the latter
category.

3

If it had been the hope of some of the justices
that they had cut the Gordian Knot and that the decision
would be accepted by the religious community, the reac
tions registered over the next ten years soon disabused
them of that notion.

Before Roe, most conservative and

traditionalist Protestants had not taken an official
stance on abortion.

The case opened the flood gates and.

began the process of pulling such groups into active
political participation on social issues for the first
time since the abolitionist and temperance movements.
Most of the conservative Protestant churches did
not react immediately as the NAE had.

By the end of the

1970s only the more fundamentalist churches had issued
statements condemning abortion, except for medical
necessity, and for rape or incest victims.

The number

of denominations issuing such statements climbed rapidly
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in the 1980s, a fact not lost on the Reagan Administra
tion.
The fourteen million member Southern Baptist Con
vention lead the way in 1980 with a volte face from its
1967, 1971, and 1974 resolutions approving abortion to
preserve the physical, emotional or mental health of the
mother, and in cases of rape, incest or severe fetal de
fect.

Its 1982 resolution went further and flatly con

demned abortion and stated support for a constitutional
amendment to limit abortion except to save the life of
the mother. That position was nearly as strong as that
taken by the Catholic hierarchy and close to what the
law had been before the abortion movement was launched
in the 1960s. 4
Another large Protestant denomination, the Assem
blies of God, issued a similar statement in 1985.
Mormons did likewise in 1986.

The

Those statements were

followed by statements by conservative branches of the
Lutheran and the Methodist traditions, including the
Salvation Army in 1986.

Some of those churches approved

abortion for medical necessity, in addition to saving
the life of the mother, and for cases of rape and in
cest.

They all shared opposition to the so-called abor

tion on demand rule of Roe v. Wade. 5
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Political Reaction
Given the authorship of the Roe opinion by Black
mun, Burger's supposed fellow strict constructionist,
and Burger's own concurrence in the decision, reaction
from the President and in Congress was initially muted.
That soon gave way to intensive efforts to nullify the
decision by constitutional amendment.

The proposed

amendments fell into four general categories:

first,

amendments declaring a fetus to be a person under the
Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process
clauses; second, amendments to restore state power to
regulate abortion; third, amendments allowing Congress
and the states to protect human life at all biological
stages; and fourth, amendments prohibiting Congress or
the states from interfering with human life at any bio
logical stage. 6
The Roe decision was issued January 23, 1973.

The

first Congressional reaction was registered the same day
when Senator James Allen made a statement condemning the
decision and placing statements by Cardinals Cooke and
Krol in the Congressional Record.

Representative Law

rence Hogan also denounced the decision on January 30,
1973 and introduced the first proposal for a constitu
tional amendment to overturn it.

On May 31, 1973 Sena

tor James Buckley introduced a proposed constitutional
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amendment he called a Human Life Amendment.

7

By 1974 hearings were held on Senate Joint Resolu
tions 119 and 130, also "right to life" amendments, by
the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Consti
tutional Amendments.

More hearings were held in 1975 on

Senator William Scott's Resolution 91 to reserve power
to regulate abortions to the states.

8

In April, 1975, during the short-lived Gerald Ford
administration, the United States Civil Rights Commis
sion chaired by Arthur Fleming weighed in with a report
in favor of Roe v. Wade.

The report included a summary

of the history of abortion in the United States written
by Jimmye Kimmey, who had marshalled the amicus briefing
effort for the plaintiffs in Roe.

The Commission criti

cized constitutional amendments under consideration in
the Congress and also the several anti-abortion riders
attached to appropriation bills.

The report specifical

ly criticized a number of proposed amendments introduced
in both the Senate and the House between 1973 and 1975.
That criticism was apparently not appreciated and the
report had no effect on future efforts to introduce
constitutional amendments in Congress. 9
Efforts similar to those in the Senate were mounted
in the House also and in 1976 over twenty-five versions
of constitutional amendments were introduced by repre-
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Congressman Don Edwards,

sentatives from both parties.

Chair of the Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommit
tee of the House Judiciary Committee, presided over a
number of hearings in that Subcommittee.

Edwards was an

opponent of amending the Constitution to overturn Roe
and apparently none of the House proposals ever made it
to the floor for a vote by the full house.

10

The first sustained attempt to reverse the
decision, Senator Jesse Helms' fetal personhood amend
ment, was tabled by the Senate on a vote of forty-seven
to forty on April 28, 1976.

Congressional efforts then

turned to cutting funding for Medicaid abortions.

That

move was more successful and the Hyde Amendment (named
after Congressman Henry Hyde), barring the use of feder
al funds for abortion except where the life of the moth
er was endangered, passed in 1976. 11
In 1981 Senator Helms and Congressman Hyde proposed
a statute defining human life.

Interestingly, Judge

Robert Bork, former Solicitor General in the Nixon ad
ministration who fired then Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox on President Nixon's orders, testified against it
along with constitutional scholars Charles Alan Wright
and Archibald Cox.

12

Meanwhile, Senator Orrin Hatch had

another proposal pending, a constitutional amendment au
thorizing state regulation of abortion, but in the par-
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liamentary maneuvering the Helms statutory proposal came
to a vote first and was defeated in the Senate forty
seven to forty-six in September, 1982.

Hatch made

another attempt in June, 1983, but his proposed amend
ment was defeated fifty to forty-nine, far short of the
two thirds required.

13

Some seventy-five resolutions were offered between
1973 and 1986 to constitutionally define a fetus as a
person under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Most

contained the proviso that abortion would still be per
mitted to save the life or health of the mother and for
pregnancy due to rape.

Approximately eighteen versions

of human life amendments were also introduced in that
time period.

None ever emerged from Congress.

14

Academic Legal Reaction
Reaction in the academic legal community to Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton was surprisingly critical.

The

first criticism came from an unexpected source, John
Hart Ely, a former law clerk for Chief Justice Earl War
ren.

Ely objected not to abortion, since he thought

that act was sometimes necessary, but to what he called
a total lack of a sense of obligation to ground a pur
ported constitutional right in a specific part of the
Constitution.

"The Constitution has little to say about
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contract, less about abortion, and those who would spec
ulate about which the framers would have been more like
ly to protect may not be pleased with the answer," he
said. He dismissed Blackmun's opinion as an analytical
twin of Lochner economic due process.
Even Lochner-style substantive due process was bet
ter than this new mutation of social due process, he
sneered, because the earlier due process at least al
lowed a state government to save its law by making a ra
tional defense in court.

By contrast, in Roe the Court

required a state to prove a compelling interest which
was, in practice, an insurmountable hurdle.

15

Richard Epstein also criticized the case strongly
in the Supreme Court Review dealing with that term of
the Court.

He said the new privacy cases were merely

the codification in constitutional jurisprudence of the
dictum of John Stewart Mill, contemporary of Herbert
Spen�er of Lochner dissent fame, from Mill's book On

Liberty, that the state should only exercise restraining
power over individuals to prevent harm to others.

In

the context of abortion, he added, that is not possible
because of the harm to the fetus.

16

Professor Robert Byrn of Fordham University was
even more critical, comparing the decision to Dred Scott

v. Sanford and Buck v. Bell, because it did not extend
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the protection of Fourteenth Amendment personhood to the
unborn at any state of development. 17

Byrn found that

position an affront to the spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment and to the understanding of the Amendment held
by its creators.is
Judicial Developments
After the decision in Roe v Wade the Court did not
revisit the issue of contraceptives for several years.
In 1977 the question of whether the right to obtain con
traceptives extended to unmarried minors was decided in
the case of Carey v. Population Services.

19

A New York

statute prohibited the sale or distribution of contra
ceptives to children under the age of eighteen and the
law was challenged under the rationale set out in the

Griswold and Eisenstadt cases.
The facts of the case showed the confused state of
public policy in the post Griswold and Roe era.

James

Hagan, Rector of St. Andrews Episcopal Church in Brook
lyn, operated the Sunset Action Group Against VD at the
church and a local store, selling and distributing male
contraceptives.

The program was funded by a grant from

the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity, but because
the age limit of the statute was not observed, it vio
lated the state law. 20
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Justice Brennan wrote an opinion for four justices
holding that the right of privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment extended to minors, without an age limit.

Po

well and Stevens concurred that there should be no re
striction for minors between fourteen and sixteen years
of age and no ban on parents furnishing contraceptives
to their children.

Rehnquist wrote a scathing dissent

from what he saw as interference by the Court with fami
ly business.

Burger, apparently unable to deal with the

legal issues, dissented without giving any reason.21

Meanwhile, the Court had decided in 1976 in Planned

Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth that a wom
an's right to get an abortion could not be limited by a
requirement of consent from her husband, or from her
parents if she were a minor.22

The Court waffled in

another case, Bellotti v. Baird, on a parental consent
requirement for minors and sent the case back to the
state.

When the case came back in 1979, the Court said

that parental consent could not be required unless there
was a procedure for the minor to obtain permission from
a judge instead of from her parents.

The Court revis

ited the issue in 1981, deciding that mere notification
of a minor's parents was not the same as requiring con
sent.23

In 1982, during consideration of three abortion
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cases, recently confirmed Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
proposed a new test which would focus on the burden on
the pregnant woman created by a state law regulating
abortion.

She proposed dropping Blackmun's trimester

formula, substituting the test of an "undue burden," but
was unsuccessful in those cases.

24

By 1989 political opposition to the rule of Roe v.
Wade had solidified in the Reagan and Bush administra
tions.

During argument of Webster v.

Reproductive

Health Services, Charles Fried, Solicitor General for
the Bush administration, advocated abandoning the funda
mental right, compelling interest test used for abortion
cases since Roe.

He proposed substituting the rational

relationship test the Court had been using since the New
Deal to uphold economic regulation.

The attorneys for

Missouri joined that approach as well.

Fried also drew

a distinction between abortion and the Griswold right of
privacy based on the sanctity of marriage, arguing that
the interests of the fetus made rigid application of
that marital right of privacy inappropriate in abortion
cases.

25

Chief Justice Rehnquist thought he had a majority
at the conference and wrote a draft opinion, but had
difficulty getting a majority to join his opinion.

He

eventually obtained sufficient support for an opinion
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upholding the right of Oregon to say in the preamble to
its abortion law that life began at conception, and
upholding the ban on using public facilities for abor
tions and requiring testing for viability.

He was not

successful in jettisoning the Roe trimester formula.

26

The abortion question had become such a hot politi
cal issue by the time of the Webster case that the Court
was virtually swamped with amicus briefs.

The case re

cord looked more like a record of a Congressional hear
ing than a court record.
briefs were accepted.

Seventy-nine separate amicus

An additional one was denied fil

ing because it attempted to argue for unborn children.
In a development James Madison might have found
startling, opposing Congressional factions filed briefs,
arguing that Roe v. Wade should be upheld, and that it
should be struck.

The list of names of the senators and

representatives signing the briefs filled four pages of
the record.

The division was not along party lines, al

though a preponderance of Democrats favored Roe and a
preponderance of Republicans opposed it.

27

That lineup was consistent with the division on the
issue begun in the 1972 election when President Nixon
came out against liberalized abortion laws and Senator
George McGovern, the Democratic candidate, said he was
personally against abortion, but would follow the law if
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it allowed abortion.

That division was continued in the

party platforms in 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992.

28

In a new twist on the emphasis Weddington, Coffee
and Lucas placed on history in their Roe briefs, a group
of liberal historians who called themselves "281 Ameri
can Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees"
submitted a brief in Webster supporting Blackmun's use
of history in Roe.

There was also a plethora of history

scattered throughout the other briefs.

At oral argument

Justice Antonin Scalia questioned Frank Susman, counsel
for plaintiff abortion providers, on a contradictory
reading of history in the brief of the Association for
Public Justice and the Value of Life Committee, Inc.

29

The gist of the clash of the scholarly debate was a
difference of opinion as to whether there had been a
tradition of legal abortions in the colonial and early
national eras.

The 281 historians followed the pattern

set by Cyrill Means in a 1968 law review article and
followed by James C. Mohr in his book, Abortion in Amer
ica, of asserting that abortion in colonial America was
not proscribed by statutory law, and was practiced free
ly.

The other side said that conclusion was a gross

misreading of legal and social history and that, of
course, there was little statutory law on the subject,
or for that matter on any subject in that era.

30
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The latest, and apparently definitive test of Roe's
validity for the 1990s, given the membership on the
Court, was Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 31 Pennsylvania's
legislature passed an abortion statute in 1989 with the
enthusiastic support of Democrat Governor Robert Casey.
It appeared to supporters of Roe that the inclusion of
abortion in the right of privacy was likely to be re
versed by a Court that had five sitting justices who had
voted against abortion rights, or who seemed inclined
that way.

Of course, if Judge Bork had been confirmed

by the Senate, believing as he does that the original
intent of the drafters should control, there would have
been no uncertainty as to his vote, as there was for at
least one of the subsequently confirmed justices.

32

The briefs filed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey re
prised those in the Webster case. Once again the oppos
ing congressional factions filed briefs.

The liberals

again implored· the Court to uphold Roe.

Conservatives

begged the Court to do what they lacked the political
power to accomplish, the repeal of Roe by constitutional
amendment, and what they hoped conservative appointments
had already achieved sub silentio.
Once again the 281 historians filed their brief,
slightly modified to fit the facts of the case, and the
American Academy of Medical Ethics filed a brief direct-
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ly challenging the historians' brief.

The Academy brief

said the historians deliberately misrepresented the com
mon law status of abortion and gave a politically moti
vated misreading of the extant common law decisions from
early English and American sources_.

Roe v. Wade was in

fact a sharp break with the American moral and legal
tradition, and Roe was not within the tradition of lib
erty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Academy
argued. 33
If some enterprising legal scholar ferrets out the
obscure case law from the colonial era we may know
whether the historians' brief contained accurate histo
ry, or if they committed what Leonard Levy calls the fe
lonious use of history.

If they did commit such an of

fense, it would be in keeping with the long tradition of
such use of history established by advocates before the
Court and by the justices themselves.

The historians'

thesis certainly finds little support in traditional
primary or secondary legal sources from the nineteenth
century.
The Court had apparently had enough of legal histo
ry and congressional importunity by that time and there
was no reference to either viewpoint during oral argu
ment, or in the majority opinion.
To the consternation of opponents of abortion, and
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the initial joy of proponents, the Court in Casey re
fused to reverse Roe v. Wad�.

Three Republicans, all

appointed in the expectation that they would remove
abortion from the constitutional right of privacy, is
sued a joint opinion, a very unusual event.
The joint opinion rejected Justice Blackmun's tri
mester formula� allowing more leeway to the states to
decide how to regulate abortion.

Justices Sandra Day

o'Conner, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter upheld the
constitutional right of a woman to get an abortion be
fore the fetus could survive outside the womb.

They

also said that the states have an interest in the moth
er's health and in the life of the fetus from the time
of conception.

After viability, abortions could be re

stricted to cases where the life of the mother was at
risk.

The opinion left considerable room for inter

pretation and future litigation as states pass laws re
stricting abortions.J 4
Justice Kennedy refused to waffle about which part
of the Bill of Rights produced the right to abortion,
saying simply that freedom to have children, or not, was
a liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In

short, it was an aspect of social substantive due pro
cess established by precedent.
The decision seemed to rest mainly on the perceived
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value of precedents in giving stability to the law and
in avoiding the appearance the Court was amenable to raw
political pressure.

The four dissenting justices did

not share that view and caustically stated Roe v. Wade
should be wiped from the books. 35
It is obvious that the Court will again be con
fronted with the question of whether to overrule Roe as
state legislatures continue to enact laws which contra
dict the spirit of Roe v. Wade.

It is also possible

that a state may pass a law encouraging, or possibly
even requiring abortion.

Any such law would conflict

with the spirit of Griswold v.
v. Oklahoma.

Connecticut and Skinner

It seems probable the Court, continuing

body that it is, would enforce its Brandeisian version
of Cooley's right to be let alone and strike any attempt
to coerce a woman in what it sees as the most private of
matters.

108
Chapter VI Endnotes
lEva R. Rubin, ed., The Abortion Controversy: A
Documentary His.tory (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1994), 140, 141, 142.
2 "Abortion and the Court," Christianity Today, Vol.
17, No. 10, 16 February, 1973, 32-33.
3 J. Gordon Melton and Gary L. Ward, eds., The
Churches Speak On Abortion (Detroit: Gale Research
Inc., 1989), 86.

4Jbid., xvi, 154; "Southern Baptists Approve Abor
tion in Certain Cases," New York Times, 3 June 1967, 43.
5 Melton,

28-32, 33, 36, 46, 81, 152, 166, 181.

6 Edward Keynes with Randall K. Miller, The Court
vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, and Abortion (Durham and
London, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 180.

7 Rubin, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158; The Human
Life Foundation, Human Life Review, 1 (1975), 7, 14.
8 Keynes, 280; Congress, Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, S.J. Res. 119, 130: Hearings Before the Sub
committee on Constitutional Amendments, 93d Cong., 2d
sess., 17 January, 1974.

9 U.S. Commiss
. ion on Civil Rights, Constitutional
Aspects of the Right to Limit Childbearing (Washington,
D.C.: Civil Rights Comm., April, 1975).
10 congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu
tional Rights on Proposed Constitutional Amendments,
94th Cong., 2d sess., 4, 5 February, 23-26 March, 1976.
11 David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality:
The
Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade (NY:
Macmillan Pub. Co., 1994), 620.

12 Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court was later
rejected by the Senate in part because of his outspoken
disagreement with the Roe decision and because he be
lieved the Constitution simply does not include a right
of privacy, especially for abortions.

109
lJGarrow, 639, 640; Keynes, 281; Congress, Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings Before the Subcom
mittee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress, 1st
sess., 23, 24 April, 20, 21 May, 1, 10, 12, 18 June,
1981; Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
97th Congress, 1st sess. 5, 14, 19 October, 4, 5, 12,
16, November, 7, 16, December, 1981.
14

Keynes, 283, 284.

John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com
ment on Roe v. Wade, " The Yale Law Journal 82 (1973):
920, 939.
15

16 Richard

A. Epstein, "Substantive Due Process By
Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases," The Supreme Court
Review, Philip B. Kurland, ed. (Chicago: The Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1973): 159-185.
11 Dred

Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857); Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the case where Justice
Holmes approved sterilization of a mentally defective
woman with the caustic comment that: "Three generations
of imbecils are enough."
18 Robert

M. Byrne, "An American Tragedy: The Su
preme Court on Abortion," Fordham Law Review 41 (May
1973), 807, 809, 812-13, 835-38, 861-62; in Eva R. Ru
bin, ed., The Abortion Controversy: A Documentary Histo
ry... (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).
Carey v. Population Services, International, 431
U.S. 678 (1977).
19

2 °Carey

v. Population Services, International, mi
crofiche ed. (Washington, D.C.: Microcard Editions,
Inc.), Transcript 2, 7a, 68a.
21 carey,

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

22 Planned

Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
forth, 428 U.S. 552 (1976).

Dan

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
23

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416; Planned Parenthood Association of
24

110
Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476; Simopoulous v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1982).

2swebster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.
ct. 3040 (1989), Phillip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper,
eds., Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Constitutional Law, 1989 Term Sup
plement (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of Amer
ica, 1993), Amicus Curiae Brief of U.S., 200-224, Oral
Arguments, 934-938.

26Garrow, 676, 677.

27Maria Protti, ed., microfiche briefs, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services (Buffalo, NY: William s.
Hein & Co., Inc., 1990), Signature Sheets of Congressio
nal Briefs.

28"President Supports Repeal of State Law on Abor
tion," New York Times, 7 May 1972, 1, 29 (ie., repeal of
the then liberal law); New York Times 8 May 1972, 1, 42,
(McGovern said he was personally opposed to abortion,
but would support law if that legalized it.); Rubin,
238, 239, 242, 243.
29Kurland, Oral Argument, 943.

30Ibid., Association for Public Justice Brief, 330;
Cyril C. Means, "The Law of New York Concerning Abor
tion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of
Cessation of Constitutionality," New York Law Forum, 14,
3 (Fall 1968): 419-526; James c. Mohr, Abortion in
America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy,
1800-1900 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1978).
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), Kur
land, Landmark Briefs, 1991 Term Supplement, Opinion
1223-1292.
31

32Garrow, 681; Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America, The Political Seduction of the Law (NY: The
Free Press, 1990).

33Kurland, American Academy of Medical Ethics
Brief, 420, 281 Historians Brief, 508, Pro-Life Congres
sional Brief, 818, Pro-Choice Congressional Brief, 1037.
34Ibid., Joint opinion, 1237-1243.

111
35 Ibid., Rehnquist dissent, 1339-1375; Scalia dis
sent, 1376-1400.

CHAPTER VII
CONSTITUTIONAL INVERSION
The question of the original intent of the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment was first raised in 1873 in
the Slaughter House Cases.

The Supreme Court rejected

the idea that the Amendment was for general economic su
pervision of state laws when no question of race dis
crimination was raised.

That view of original intent

was rejected in the Allgeyer, Lochner line of cases.

In

the Lochner era the Court approved or disapproved
state economic laws, especially those about working
conditions, depending on whether it thought they interf
ered with what it called liberty of contract.
Neither Miller, in examining the history "fresh
...within the memory of us all," nor any of the other
sitting Justices in the Slaughter House Cases, put much
effort into searching out the congressional and state
legislative debates on the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

Lochner era Court followed in their footsteps. 1
That issue was revisited when the Court began to
selectively apply the Bill of Rights to protect personal
rights from state laws and procedures.
112

Professor Fair-
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man was undoubtedly right that the original intent of
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
was not to incorporate the Bill of Rights into its
clauses.

But, although the Court never accepted Black's

complete incorporation theory, that did not deter the
Warren Court, pushed along by the civil rights movement
and by its own agenda, from applying almost the entire
Bill of Rights as a restraint on state activity.

2

By the time contraception and abortion came to the
Court, it was ready to deal actively with those issues.
Contraception and abortion were less amenable procedur
ally to use of the new equal protection doctrine so·use
ful in protecting the civil rights of blacks so the
Court reached back to the doctrine of substantive due
process which had fallen into desuetude.

The poor doc

trinal fit·for abortion issues was soon obvious.

As in

the Lochner era, the Court found itself engaged in a
running battle with state legislatures.

But, unlike the

reconstituted New Deal Court, the Reagan Court did not
simply abandon the new social substantive due process in
the face of efforts to amend the Constitution and ap
point justices willing to strike Roe.
The nation has accepted the accretional incorpora
tion of those rights in the Bill of Rights believed fun
damental to the American tradition.

In areas where the
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issues are more substantive than procedural, there has
been more resistance, as illustrated by the continued
agitation over the establishment and free speech clauses
of the First Amendment. There has not been a comparable
effort to resist the Court's interpretation of the law
for marital and family rights, probably because those
rights fall well within the American tradition of per
sonal liberty.

A comparable consensus is lacking in the

abortion controversy.
Loving v. Virginia illustrated how far the Court
could move to reject history and precedent to change a
tradition no longer accepted by the American people.
The Griswold case presented a closer question, mostly
because the Court was not clear in defining the source
of sexual privacy.

It later rejected including homo

sexual acts in the scope of the right of privacy and re
fused to overturn state sodomy laws.

3

That did not re

solve the issue and legal challenges to such laws con
tinue.
In Roe v. Wade the Court included a woman's unilat
eral decision to abort her nascent child in the right of
sexual privacy.

That decision did not resolve the issue

and legal debate continues in that area.

The problem

may lie in the attempt of the Court to pour new social
issues into old doctrinal wineskins, the alternative be-
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ing to wait until the political process has reached a
consensus before it does the pouring.
Although it is hard to envision the Constitutional
Founders, or the Reconstruction Rebuilders, intending to
legalize abortion, or to deal with any sexual matter at
all, the question of original intent has played little
part in the disposition of cases before the Court.

In

practice, the modern Court has effectively turned the
Constitutional amending process upside down, as the Loc

hner Court did in the era of economic substantive due
process.

4

It is clear the Court has always been an active
participant in the governing process.

It is a part of

the ruling coalition by virtue of the political process
of selection and confirmation of justices by popularly
elected presidents and senators.

As a part of the gov

ernment the Court has been acting within the boundaries
of the politically possible.

5

No anti-abortion consti

tutional amendments have been voted out of Congress be
cause less than two-thirds of Congress has ever been in
favor of striking Roe v. Wade.

That it is consistent

with the pattern established by congressional approval,
tacit or express, of the Court's civil rights decisions
before new civil rights acts were passed in the 1960s,
and of its selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights
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into the Fourteenth Amendment.

6

The constitutional process requires a super major
ity in Congress, or among the states, to have an amend
ment presented to the states.

A super majority of the

states is required to ratify an amendment.

That process

has only been successful in extraordinary circumstances.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
were ratified to abolish slavery, the Sixteenth to allow
the government a modern tax collection method.

The

Eighteenth and the Twenty-First were passed to bring
Prohibition in and throw it out, and the Nineteenth to
give women the vote.
By contrast, the Court has selectively incorporated
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and ex
ercised plenary power in enforcing substantive due pro
cess rights without formal congressional or state ac
tion.

There being insufficient political objection, the

changes have stuck.

Whether one thinks, as Judge Robert

Bork does, that such a state of affairs is a travesty of
what the founders intended, or that the Constitution
must be given new meaning in new circumstance, as Leon
ard Levy does, the fact remains that the Supreme Court
practices the art of what it sees as legally and politi
cally possible.

7

There is no tradition of changing judicial consti-
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tutional interpretations by the amending process.
Therein lies the power of the Supreme Court, a fundamen
tally political institution, although the politics are
cloaked in the arcane language of constitutional dogma.
In the absence of sustained revulsion against one of its
decisions, the Court exercises sufficient political pow
er to create a constitutional right, such as the right
of sexual privacy, from the barest hint of such a power
in the language of the Constitution.

Judge Bork is

probably right in saying the founding fathers did not
intend that result, but there seems no practical way to
change the fact, unless the Court exercises self-imposed
restraint, or a political change comparable to the New
Deal changes the membership of the Court.
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